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Formation of contract 
Offer and acceptance 
12.1 The coincidence of offer and acceptance is a basic but necessary 
requirement of every valid contract. Whether this requirement is 
satisfied is largely dependent on the precise facts of the case concerned. 
Due to the fact-centric nature of the enquiry, it is difficult to draw 
general propositions from the cases, but the High Court’s approach in 
Lim Beng Cheng v Lim Ngee Sing [2016] 1 SLR 524 (“Lim Beng Cheng”) 
provides some guidance in this regard. 
12.2 The principal question in that case was whether the parties 
entered into an agreement in October 2010, under which the defendant 
promised to transfer a 46.5% stake in a property to the plaintiff. The 
defendant contended that the alleged contract was merely a proposal 
that he never accepted. Judith Prakash J rejected this contention, finding 
it clear that a binding agreement was indeed formed. Importantly, 
her Honour found that the language used in the document suggested 
that it was meant to be binding between the parties. In particular, the 
document had used words such as “the agreed settlement”, “in view of 
this agreement” and “it is agreed”. The learned judge’s focus on the 
contractual language is in line with the Court of Appeal’s approach in 
Woo Kah Wai v Chew Ai Hua Sandra [2014] 4 SLR 166 (noted 
in Alvin W-L See, “Contract for the Grant of a Compliant Option to 
Purchase” [2015] Sing JLS 241 and discussed in (2014) 15 SAL 
Ann Rev 217 at 217–218, paras 12.2–12.5), where the court also 
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emphasised the parties’ express references to the words “offer” and 
“acceptance” as being crucial towards its finding of a binding contract. 
12.3 Prakash J in Lim Beng Cheng also considered it important that 
the parties signed the document after spending an hour preparing it. In 
her Honour’s view, if the document was a mere proposal, the parties 
would not have signed it, much less spent a considerable amount of time 
preparing it. Furthermore, Prakash J also rejected the defendant’s 
contention that he would not have agreed to the terms, which were 
“onerous and commercially insensible” (Lim Beng Cheng at [50]). On the 
facts, her Honour struggled to find any commercial insensibility of the 
kind that would cast doubt on the genuineness of the defendant’s 
consent. Finally, Prakash J also dismissed as an afterthought the 
defendant’s argument that the parties’ subsequent conduct showed that 
the document signed in October 2010 was meant to be a proposal. 
Indeed, the defendant did not deny his obligation to transfer the 
promised share of the property concerned to the plaintiff until 2013. 
12.4 More broadly, Prakash J’s approach in Lim Beng Cheng is 
entirely consistent with, and an apt reminder of, the objectivity principle 
that underlies the ascertainment of offer and acceptance (see generally, 
The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) 
(Academy Publishing, 2012) at paras 03.006–03.014). Indeed, as 
Blackburn J said in the classical case of Smith v Hughes (1871) 
LR 6 QB 597 at 607, regardless of a man’s real intention, he would be 
bound if his conduct reasonably leads another party to enter into a 
contract with him. This also accords with the Court of Appeal’s 
adoption of the promisee-objectivity approach in Tribune Investment 
Trust Inc v Soosan Trading Co Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 407 
(“Tribune Investment”), where the court said (at 422–423) that “the 
language used by one party, whatever his real intention may be, is to be 
construed in the sense in which it would be reasonably understood by 
the other”. These general principles were undeniably applied in 
Lim Beng Cheng, in which Prakash J adopted a decidedly objective 
approach towards the language used in the document, as well as the 
parties’ conduct before and after the conclusion of the agreement. 
12.5 As a legal matter, Prakash J’s treatment of the defendant’s 
argument, that the parties’ subsequent conduct showed that the original 
document remained a proposal, requires some clarification. Although 
her Honour rightly found on the facts that the defendant’s argument was 
a mere afterthought, the issue could have been dealt with on the legal 
principle that the parties’ subsequent conduct cannot alter the existence 
of the contract between them (see, eg, Perry v Suffields Ltd [1916] 
2 Ch 187). The “exception” to this principle is if the parties’ subsequent 
conduct shows an agreement to rescind the original contract. However, 
the defendant’s argument in Lim Beng Cheng was not on such a basis, 
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and had seemingly proceeded on the legally impermissible approach 
that the parties’ subsequent conduct had somehow altered the 
objectively ascertained nature of the original agreement. 
12.6 A more specific aspect of offer and acceptance was discussed in 
the Court of Appeal decision of Ong & Ong Pte Ltd v Fairview 
Developments Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 470 (“Ong & Ong”). The primary 
issue in that case was whether general contractual principles applied 
generally to the offer to settle (“OTS”) regime under O 22A of the 
Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed). The court held that they did 
not, contrary to the High Court’s analysis in Chia Kim Huay v Saw Shu 
Mawa Min Min [2012] 4 SLR 1096 (discussed in (2012) 13 SAL Ann Rev 
195 at 197–198, paras 12.8–12.15). However, the court also emphasised 
that this did not mean that contractual principles have no place at all 
under the OTS regime: Ong & Ong at [53]. 
12.7 Apart from that issue of civil procedure, the court also had 
occasion to consider whether a fundamental change in circumstances, 
occurring between the time an offer was made and before it was 
accepted, could cause the offer to lapse. This issue had previously been 
considered by the High Court in Norwest Holdings Pte Ltd v 
Newport Mining Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 956 (“Norwest Holdings”) (see (2010) 
11 SAL Ann Rev 239 at 241, para 11.7). As was discussed in (2011) 12 
SAL Ann Rev 182 at 187, para 11.15, Belinda Ang Saw Ean J considered 
that the contemporary juridical basis for an offer lapsing due to changed 
circumstances was premised on the explanation in either Financings 
Ltd v Stimson [1962] 1 WLR 1184 (“Financings Ltd”) (which had implied 
a condition into the offer that the subject matter of the offer must 
remain in substantially the same condition as it was at the time of the 
offer, failing which the offer lapses), or Dysart Timbers Ltd v Roderick 
William Nielsen [2009] 3 NZLR 160 (“Dysart Timbers”) (which had 
required the change in circumstances to be fundamental before the 
associated offer could be said to have lapsed). In the end, however, her 
Honour dismissed the explanations employed in Financings Ltd and 
Dysart Timbers as unconvincing due to the artificiality of implying a 
term to unanticipated changes in circumstances. Instead, her Honour 
thought that the doctrine of offer and acceptance and common mistake 
were adequate to explain the consequences of changed circumstances 
which occur after an offer was made and before the offer was accepted. 
Although the decision generated some degree of academic interest (see, 
eg, Christopher Hare, “Changed Circumstances and Lapsing Offers” 
[2010] LMCLQ 379 and David McLauchlan & Rick Bigwood, “Lapse of 
Offers Due to Changed Circumstances: A Contract Conversation” 
(2011) 27 JCL 222), the Court of Appeal declined to comment on the 
correctness of Ang J’s views when the case went on appeal before it  
(see [2011] 4 SLR 617). 
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12.8 In Ong & Ong, the Court of Appeal had to consider the 
appellant’s argument that a fundamental change in circumstances in that 
case freed it from being bound to the OTS. In the course of doing so, the 
court appeared to accept the explanation provided in Dysart Timbers in 
relation to the lapse of an offer caused by a fundamental change in 
circumstances. In particular, the court alluded to the views expressed in 
The Law of Contract in Singapore ((Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) 
(Academy Publishing, 2012) at paras 03.096–03.098) that, contrary to 
the view expressed in Norwest Holdings, the doctrines of offer and 
acceptance, and common mistake, cannot properly explain why an offer 
would lapse in a fundamental change in circumstances. The court then 
said (at [73]) that “there seem[ed] to be room for the application of the 
doctrine of fundamental change in circumstances per Dysart Timbers”. 
While it is not entirely clear whether the court accepted the explanation 
provided in Dysart Timbers, the better view is that it has, given that it 
proceeded to examine whether there was any fundamental change in 
circumstances on the facts of Ong & Ong itself. 
Consideration 
12.9 The issue of whether the forbearance of an invalid claim 
furnished sufficient consideration arose in Lim Beng Cheng (above, 
para 12.1). The defendant argued that the only consideration provided 
by the plaintiff, in support of the agreement between them, was the 
withdrawal of a caveat over another property, which the plaintiff was 
supposedly bound to do in any case. While Judith Prakash J found that 
the plaintiff had provided good consideration elsewhere, her Honour 
considered that the plaintiff ’s forbearance to sue on a doubtful or even 
“clearly invalid” claim is good consideration, if there are reasonable 
grounds for the promisor’s claim and if the promiser honestly believes 
he has a fair chance of success (Lim Beng Cheng at [58], citing Abdul Jalil 
bin Ahmad bin Talib v A Formation Construction Pte Ltd [2006] 
4 SLR(R) 778 (“Abdul Jalil”) at [42]). The learned judge considered that 
this principle applied to the plaintiff ’s promise to withdraw the caveat. 
On the facts, the plaintiff was actually not entitled to lodge the caveat 
since it claimed an interest as purchaser in respect of a contract for sale 
dated April 2008, and the plaintiff only obtained an interest in 
November 2008. The plaintiff did not lodge a caveat after 
November 2008 because the April 2008 caveat had not been discharged, 
and he believed in good faith in October 2010 that he was entitled to 
maintain the caveat. Thus, the plaintiff ’s promise to withdraw the caveat 
constituted good consideration. In any event, Prakash J also noted that, 
had the plaintiff not removed the caveat, the defendant would have been 
put to expense and delay in obtaining an order to effect its removal. This 
likewise conferred a benefit on the defendant and hence could be 
construed as good consideration. 
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12.10 Strictly speaking, the facts of Lim Beng Cheng did not involve a 
forbearance to sue, since the plaintiff made no promise not to sue. 
Instead, it involved a promise not to maintain a claim. Understood in 
this manner, there is in principle no objection to Prakash J’s application 
of the principle in Abdul Jalil to the facts in Lim Beng Cheng. 
Undergirding both an action to sue and the maintenance of a claim is 
the existence of a right over the defendant that the plaintiff thought, 
rightly or wrongly, that it has. If the plaintiff forgoes this right, then that 
would result in a practical benefit to the defendant even if the right were 
invalid to begin with. There would be such a practical benefit because, 
as Prakash J explained in Lim Beng Cheng, the defendant in such cases is 
likely spared the expenses and time involved in contesting the plaintiff ’s 
alleged right over it. More broadly, Prakash J’s invocation of this 
principle accords with how courts both in Singapore and abroad find 
consideration most readily in commercial matters (see, eg,  
Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR(R) 594 
at [139] and Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric 
[2007] 1 SLR(R) 853 at [29]). 
Certainty and completeness 
12.11 It is trite law that a contract must be certain and complete 
before it can be enforceable. Another way of putting this principle across 
is that, before there can be a concluded contract, its terms must be 
certain and the agreement must similarly be complete. A term that is 
“uncertain” exists but is otherwise incomprehensible. In contrast, an 
agreement that is “incomplete” has certain terms that do not (but 
should) exist and the non-existence of these terms make the agreement 
incomprehensible. A contract may be unenforceable for uncertainty or 
incompleteness even though there has otherwise been both offer and 
acceptance between the parties. 
12.12 In Lim Beng Cheng (above, para 12.1), the defendant contended 
(at [93]) that the agreement in question was uncertain because of the 
“various factual distortions on [its] face”. It is unclear what this meant, 
although Judith Prakash J rightly held that this was a non-starter since 
what must be certain in a contract are its terms and not recitals of facts. 
Moreover, her Honour said (Lim Beng Cheng at [93]) that the 
uncertainty of the secondary obligations cannot render a contract 
unenforceable. Prakash J’s reference to a “secondary obligation” must 
not be taken to refer to the sense that term is used in distinction to a 
“primary obligation”. This is because the principle is that it is uncertainty 
in essential terms that renders the contract unenforceable, and there is 
every possibility that a secondary obligation, which arises on the part of 
the party in breach of a primary obligation to pay the other party a sum 
of money, can constitute an essential term. Thus, it is likely that 
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Prakash J’s reference to “secondary obligations” was intended to refer to 
“non-essential obligations”, as contrasted with “essential” or “primary” 
obligations, which, if uncertain, would render the contract 
unenforceable. 
12.13 The principle that uncertain essential terms would render the 
contract unenforceable was also applied in the High Court decision of 
Harwindar Singh s/o Geja Singh v Wong Lok Yung Michael [2015] 
4 SLR 69. In that case, the plaintiff claimed that he agreed to join the 
first defendant on a business venture in the Middle East on a low salary 
and commission on the latter’s oral promises that: (a) if any of the 
companies to be incorporated in the Middle East were sold, he would be 
paid a lump sum to make up for the loss in salary he would suffer; 
and (b) if any of those companies were listed, he would be paid a lump 
sum as would all senior management of the companies; and (c) be 
appointed to a senior management position and given a significant 
salary increase. The first defendant moved to strike out the plaintiff ’s 
claim on, among others, the ground that the alleged promises were 
insufficiently certain to form a contract. 
12.14 Chua Lee Ming JC held that the alleged promises were too 
uncertain to constitute a binding contract between the parties. 
His Honour agreed with the first defendant that it was unclear: (a) what 
the “loss in salary” should be or how it was to be calculated; (b) what the 
“lump sum” to be paid should be or who in “senior management” that 
sum should be pegged to; and (c) what “senior management position” 
the plaintiff was supposed to be appointed to. Above all, there was also 
no mechanism to decide any of these matters. This remained the case 
even though the plaintiff had provided a range of salaries which his “loss 
in salary” would fall within; there was simply no way for the court to 
ascertain what the parties had agreed to within that range. 
12.15 The issue of the certainty of contractual terms also surfaced in 
the High Court decision of Likpin International Ltd v Swiber Holdings 
Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 962 (“Likpin International”). The case concerned the 
alleged breach of an oral charterparty. Steven Chong J held that the 
alleged oral charterparty was unenforceable because the supposedly 
agreed rate of hire was said to be “approximately US$130,000” per day. 
As his Honour rightly noted (Likpin International at [44]), should the 
law recognise a contract with such a term, “there would be endless, 
insoluble, disputes as to what the agreed rate of hire is”. The inability of 
the courts to ascertain just what the parties had agreed where there is 
insufficient certainty is indeed the underlying rationale behind the 
principle that contracts containing uncertain essential terms are 
unenforceable. 
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Existence of an oral agreement 
12.16 The High Court decision of ARS v ART [2015] SGHC 78 
(“ARS”) provides a helpful summary of the principles used to ascertain 
the existence of an oral agreement. The starting point, as laid down by 
the Court of Appeal in Tribune Investment (above, para 12.4), is that 
where no formal written agreement was entered into or signed by the 
parties, the existence of any contract “must thus be culled from the 
written correspondence and contemporaneous conduct of the parties at 
the material time”: Tribune Investment at [39]. 
12.17 After a careful analysis of the relevant cases, Quentin Loh J set 
out (ARS at [53]) the following guiding principles on the proper 
approach for determining the existence of an oral agreement: 
(a) in ascertaining the existence of an oral agreement, the court 
will consider the relevant documentary evidence (such as written 
correspondence) and contemporaneous conduct of the parties at the 
material time; 
(b) where possible, the court should look first at the relevant 
documentary evidence; 
(c) the availability of relevant documentary evidence reduces the 
need to rely solely on the credibility of witnesses in order to ascertain 
if an oral agreement exists; 
(d) oral testimony may be less reliable as it is based on the 
witness’s recollection and it may be affected by subsequent events 
(such as the dispute between the parties); 
(e) credible oral testimony may clarify the existing documentary 
evidence; 
(f) where the witness is not legally trained, the court should not 
place undue emphasis on the choice of words; and 
(g) if there is little or no documentary evidence, the court will 
nevertheless examine the precise factual matrix to ascertain if there is 
an oral agreement concluded between the parties. 
12.18 These principles, premised as they are on an objective approach, 
will undoubtedly be useful pointers in the situation where the existence 
of an oral contract needs to be ascertained. 
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Terms of the contract 
Interpretation of terms 
General principles 
12.19 The law on the interpretation of contractual terms in Singapore 
is largely settled. The Court of Appeal decisions of Sembcorp Marine 
Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”) and 
Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & 
Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 (“Zurich Insurance”) – 
described by the same court in Y.E.S. F&B Group Pte Ltd v Soup 
Restaurant Singapore Pte Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 1187 (“Y.E.S.”) (at [41]) as the 
“lodestars” in the Singapore law on contractual interpretation – now 
provide for the relevant principles of contractual interpretation here. 
Together, Sembcorp Marine and Zurich Insurance established a two-step 
framework for the interpretation of contracts. First, the extrinsic 
evidence that is admissible must be ascertained and secondly, the 
contract is then interpreted contextually with the admitted extrinsic 
evidence in mind. 
12.20 While the general approach is not in doubt, two decisions 
in 2015 provided valuable guidance on the understanding of the relevant 
principles. In so far as general principles are concerned, Vinodh 
Coomaraswamy J in HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Lucky Realty Co Pte 
Ltd [2015] 3 SLR 885 (“HSBC Trustee”) (overturned on appeal in Lucky 
Realty Co Pte Ltd v HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd [2016] 1 SLR 1069, but 
not on the law) undertook a comprehensive restatement of those 
principles after a detailed study of the authorities. Although 
his Honour’s restatement does not change the law – and there is no 
reason to given the certainty already provided for by Sembcorp Marine 
and Zurich Insurance – it does provide another way with which to 
understand the relevant principles. 
12.21 Most broadly, Coomaraswamy J extracted four important points 
from Zurich Insurance, namely: 
(a) First, the goal of construing a contract was to determine 
and give effect to the intention of the parties, objectively 
ascertained. As such, the parties’ subjective intentions were 
ordinarily immaterial to construing their contract. 
(b) Secondly, the purpose of construing a contract was to 
give the contract a meaning that fairly represented the parties’ 
objective ascertained intention. It was certainly not to achieve a 
result that was just and fair in all the circumstances of the case. 
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(c) Thirdly, the construction exercise had to ascribe to the 
words and phrases chosen by the parties in their contract some 
legitimate meaning. It was thus wrong to give those words a 
meaning beyond the contours of their penumbral meaning, or 
no meaning at all. 
(d) Fourthly, the contextual approach obliged the court to 
have regard to the evidence extrinsic to the words used by the 
parties. However, the evidence must satisfy the Zurich Insurance 
criteria. 
12.22 In turn, the learned judge opined that Sembcorp Marine 
supplemented Zurich Insurance in three ways, namely: 
(a) First, Sembcorp Marine distinguished between 
“interpretation” and “construction” of a contract. 
(b) Secondly, Sembcorp Marine emphasised the distinction 
between the substantive law of contract and the adjectival law of 
evidence. 
(c) Thirdly, Sembcorp Marine identified legal and 
pragmatic factors that militated against taking an overly robust 
approach to the use of extrinsic evidence as an aid to 
construction. These constraints justified the criteria imposed by 
Zurich Insurance, and also their cautious application. 
12.23 It is difficult to disagree with much of Coomaraswamy J’s 
restatement of the applicable law. Indeed, much of the learned judge’s 
restatement had been similarly covered in academic writings which 
attempted to explain the effect that Sembcorp Marine had on 
Zurich Insurance, as well as the state of the law after these two pivotal 
cases (see, eg, Goh Yihan, “The New Contractual Interpretation in 
Singapore: From Zurich Insurance to Sembcorp Marine” [2013] 
Sing JLS 301). A minor point might be made of the learned judge’s use of 
the word “construction” in the course of his judgment, even when 
referring to situations clearly involving “interpretation”, in accordance 
with the definition made in Sembcorp Marine that “construction” refers 
to a composite process encompassing interpretation, as well as 
implication and rectification. Indeed, this was a point the learned judge 
himself recognised in HSBC Trustee (at [38]). As such, and with respect, 
it might have been clearer if the word “interpretation” had been used 
when what was being referred to was really the process of giving 
meaning to express words. Notwithstanding this very minor point, 
however, the learned judge’s restatement of the relevant principles is 
very much welcome, and now provides a focal point from which future 
analysis may be undertaken. 
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12.24 Coomaraswamy J’s second point in HSBC Trustee about 
Zurich Insurance, that it is not the purpose of contractual interpretation 
to achieve a result that was just and fair in all the circumstances of the 
case, was further explained by the Court of Appeal in Y.E.S. (above, 
para 12.19). The court considered that the context can never be used by 
a court to rewrite the terms of the contract according to the court’s 
subjective view of what it thinks is the correct result in a particular case. 
Thus, while it might be commercially sensible to avoid an absurd result, 
the court has no choice but to give effect to such a result “if the objective 
evidence clearly bears out a causative connection between the absurd 
result or consequences on the one hand and the intention of the parties 
at the time they entered into the contract on the other” [emphasis in 
original]: Y.E.S. at [32]. Put another way, the court must ascertain the 
parties’ intention at the time they entered into the contract based on all 
the relevant objective evidence, give effect to that, and do no more. 
12.25 More broadly, the Court of Appeal also emphasised the 
interaction between both text and context in every case, even as the text 
ought always to be the first port of call for the court. Thus, what might 
at first glance appear to be plain and unambiguous text may not in fact 
be so, once the court has examined the relevant context. Indeed, where 
the text is ambiguous, the relevant context will become of signal 
importance to the court in ascertaining the parties’ objective intention 
in the circumstances. In the end, as the Court of Appeal put it aptly, 
there is “no magic formula or legal silver bullet” and that “[c]ontractual 
interpretation is (often at least) hard work, centring on a meticulous and 
nuanced (yet practically-oriented) analysis of the relevant text and 
context”: Y.E.S. at [35]. 
12.26 The Court of Appeal’s guidance on the need to give effect to an 
absurd result as revealed by the objective evidence of the parties’ 
intention is very much welcome. It leads to three points of practical 
application: 
(a) First, if, after a careful examination of the admissible 
evidence, the court comes to the conclusion that the parties did 
intend an absurd result, then the court has to give effect to it. 
This was a point emphasised not only at length by the Court of 
Appeal in Y.E.S., but also referred to by Coomaraswamy J 
in HSBC Trustee. This is also consistent with the UK 
Supreme Court’s approach in Arnold v Britton [2015] 
2 WLR 1593 (“Arnold”), in which Lord Neuberger PSC (with 
whom Lord Sumption and Lord Hughes JJSC agreed) said 
(at [19]) that “while commercial common sense is a very 
important factor to take into account when interpreting a 
contract, a court should be very slow to reject the natural 
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meaning of a provision as correct simply because it appears to 
be a very imprudent term for one of the parties to have agreed”. 
(b) Secondly, if, however, after a careful examination of the 
admissible evidence, the court is presented with two equally 
possible interpretations, then it should prefer the one that is 
more commercially sensible. This is the approach advocated by 
the Court of Appeal in Y.E.S., as well as the earlier decision of 
Master Marine AS v Labory Offshore Ltd [2012] 3 SLR 125. It 
also accords with the approach adopted by the UK 
Supreme Court in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 
1 WLR 2900, in which Lord Clarke JSC stated (at [30]) that 
“where a term of a contract is open to more than one 
interpretation, it [is] generally appropriate to adopt the 
interpretation which is most consistent with business common 
sense”. It must be stressed, however, that this presumption in 
favour of a commercially sensible interpretation would be 
displaced by evidence that the parties in fact intended an 
interpretation that is not commercially sensible, or even absurd. 
(c) Thirdly, and more broadly, the starting point of 
interpretation is the text of the contract. Thus, as 
Coomaraswamy J suggested in HSBC Trustee, the courts cannot 
stray too far from the penumbral meaning of the words used by 
the parties. However, as the Court of Appeal explained (at [47]) 
in Y.E.S., this does not mean that, where the parties have used 
unambiguous language, the court must apply those words 
without utilising the relevant context to assist in the process of 
contractual interpretation. This is entirely in line with the Court 
of Appeal’s sentiment that the text and context interact with one 
another in the interpretative exercise. It also gives effect to an 
often-missed point that the determination of words as 
“unambiguous” is itself an interpretative exercise, that takes 
place against the relevant context, be it the internal context of 
the document, or the relevant background information, 
however broad. This was so demonstrated by the Court of 
Appeal’s analysis of Arnold in Y.E.S.: the majority in Arnold 
applied the plain meaning of the clear and unambiguous words 
only because it was consistent with its contextual meaning. 
12.27 These general principles underlie the two-step framework that 
informs contractual interpretation in Singapore. In some ways, they are 
mandated by provisions of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) 
(“EA”), which governs the admissible evidence, and to which we now 
turn. 
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Admissible evidence 
Types of extrinsic evidence 
12.28 In HSBC Trustee, Coomaraswamy J provided a helpful overview 
of how the EA affected what his Honour categorised as the four broad 
types of extrinsic evidence: 
(a) First, evidence of the circumstances surrounding the 
contract can be admitted without restriction, by virtue of 
proviso (f) to s 94 of the EA. According to the learned judge, the 
“legal and practical constraints to receiving this type of extrinsic 
evidence as an aid to construction were significantly lower than 
for the other three types of extrinsic evidence” and the law of 
evidence “admits evidence of this type without restriction”: 
HSBC Trustee at [44] and [45]. 
(b) Secondly, evidence of the parties’ subjective intentions 
can only be admitted as an aid to construction, but only if there 
is an ambiguity in the contract, and even then, only if the 
ambiguity is latent: HSBC Trustee at [48]. This is given effect to 
by ss 94–100 of the EA. 
(c) Thirdly and fourthly, prior negotiations and subsequent 
conduct can respectively be admitted if, “like all extrinsic 
evidence … [they] satisfy the three Zurich [Insurance] criteria”: 
HSBC Trustee at [50]. 
12.29 While Coomaraswamy J’s identification of the four broad 
categories of extrinsic evidence lends some clarity towards 
understanding the cases, it might be asked whether there is a need to 
distinguish the different types of extrinsic evidence in this manner. First 
of all, as has been argued for in academic literature (see, eg, Goh Yihan, 
“The Case for Departing From the Exclusionary Rule Against Prior 
Negotiations in the Interpretation of Contracts in Singapore” (2013) 
25 SAcLJ 182), the EA does not itself distinguish between the extrinsic 
evidence in the manner adopted by the learned judge. If the law of 
evidence governs the type of evidence that can be considered by the 
courts in the interpretative exercise, then how the EA classifies extrinsic 
evidence should be determinative of how they should be legally 
distinguished. In the EA, there is no separate treatment accorded to 
“prior negotiations” and “subsequent conduct”. The only distinction 
drawn by ss 93–100 of the EA is that between the parties’ subjective 
intention and other extrinsic evidence. Thus, if a distinction is to be 
drawn, it is respectfully suggested that it should perhaps be along the 
learned judge’s first and second categories only. 
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12.30 In defence of Coomaraswamy J’s approach, the English courts 
have consistently treated prior negotiations and subsequent conduct as 
separate classes of extrinsic evidence of their own. Whether this is 
correct substantively or is a mere incident of history is debatable, the 
fact remains that the Singapore courts have been influenced by this and 
do in fact, single these type of extrinsic evidence out for special 
treatment. Thus, viewed in this light, Coomaraswamy J was certainly 
not wrong, and may in fact have been bound, to consider prior 
negotiations and subsequent conduct as separate classes of extrinsic 
evidence. Indeed, in Sembcorp Marine, the Court of Appeal left open the 
question of whether prior negotiations should be admissible, thereby in 
the process singling such evidence out. In fact, several decisions 
from 2015 weighed in on the admissibility of prior negotiations and 
subsequent conduct. 
Admissibility of prior negotiations and subsequent conduct 
12.31 The most significant of these decisions is that of Xia Zhengyan v 
Geng Changqing [2015] 3 SLR 732 (“Xia Zhengyan”), from the Court of 
Appeal. The case concerned the interpretation of a sale and purchase 
agreement between the parties. As part of their cases in favour of 
competing interpretations of the agreement, both parties tendered 
various drafts of the agreement concerned. However, as the court rightly 
noted, the parties did not address the legal question of whether these 
drafts, which are properly prior negotiations, are admissible and 
relevant for the purposes of contractual interpretation. It was in this 
context that the court considered whether prior negotiations should 
indeed be admissible for this purpose. 
12.32 The Court of Appeal commenced by noting that it had left the 
issue expressly open in Sembcorp Marine. The court also noted that it 
had in Zurich Insurance laid down the three criteria of relevancy, 
reasonable availability, and relation to a clear and obvious context before 
any extrinsic evidence can be admitted for the purposes of contractual 
interpretation. Without deciding whether there was a blanket 
prohibition against prior negotiations generally, the court held that such 
evidence would not usually satisfy the third Zurich Insurance criterion 
in any event. Indeed, as the court noted (at [65]), the reliance on draft 
agreements cannot normally amount to a clear and obvious context as 
“the court is very much left in the dark with regard to the actual 
bargaining process undertaken by the contracting parties in the course 
of negotiations”. Thus, on that reason alone, prior negotiations would 
not be admissible. 
12.33 However, the Court of Appeal also made it clear that not all 
prior negotiations would fall foul of the criterion of a clear and obvious 
context. It raised the example of Inglis v John Buttery & Co (1878) 
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3 App Cas 552 (“Inglis”), in which there was a contract for works on a 
ship for a fixed sum of £17,250. In the course of negotiations between 
the parties, the agent for the shipowners proposed that a deletion be 
effected on the draft agreement such as any new plating required before 
the ship could be classed would be paid for by the shipbuilder. The 
shipbuilder agreed to the proposed deletion. Eventually, there was a 
dispute as to who should pay for new plating that turned out to be 
necessary. The House of Lords refused to admit the prior drafts which 
contained the deletions. However, as V K Rajah JA has written 
extra-judicially (see V K Rajah, “Redrawing the Boundaries of 
Contractual Interpretation” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 513), and as the Court of 
Appeal accepted in Xia Zhengyan, the prior negotiations in Inglis would 
plainly have satisfied the three Zurich Insurance criteria and easily 
resolved the dispute there. This is therefore a good example of prior 
negotiations that would have been admitted, if such admissibility is only 
predicated on the three Zurich Insurance criteria. 
12.34 In the end, the Court of Appeal in Xia Zhengyan emphasised 
that whether prior negotiations ought to be generally admissible is still 
an open legal question that remains to be worked out in a future case. 
Thus, notwithstanding the court’s demonstration of how some prior 
negotiations could satisfy the Zurich Insurance criteria, the position 
remains that they are not generally admissible on that basis until 
resolved in a subsequent Court of Appeal decision. In light of this 
pronouncement, the High Court’s approach in HSBC Trustee that 
treated the admissibility of prior negotiations as being governed by the 
same rules that govern all other extrinsic evidence, should now be 
doubted. While a potential argument can be made that the EA was never 
meant to import the English exclusionary rule against prior negotiations 
into Singapore, the fact remains that the Court of Appeal has expressly 
left the issue open. Therefore, as a matter of precedent, the legal position 
in Singapore must be that, until the Court of Appeal itself resolves the 
issue one way or the other, there remains a blanket prohibition against 
the admission of prior negotiations in Singapore. It would not be useful 
to say that there is at present a “cautious” approach against the 
admissibility of prior negotiations, because that does not spell out 
clearly the requirements for admission: ought the three Zurich Insurance 
criteria be applied “more strictly”, and if so, how much “more strictly”; 
or are there additional, more stringent, requirements on top of those 
criteria? 
12.35 The same approach appears to apply for the admissibility of 
subsequent conduct for the purposes of contractual interpretation. 
Indeed, in Xia Zhengyan, the Court of Appeal referred to 
Zurich Insurance, in which the court observed that “the relevance of 
subsequent conduct remains a controversial and evolving topic that will 
require more extensive scrutiny … at a more appropriate juncture”: 
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Zurich Insurance at [132(d)]. Thus, a series of High Court decisions that 
have used subsequent conduct to aid in contractual interpretation must 
now be reconsidered. First, the High Court’s approach in HSBC Trustee 
that the admissibility of subsequent conduct as being governed by the 
same rules that govern all other extrinsic evidence must now be 
doubted. Secondly, the High Court’s statement in Leong Hin Chuee v 
Citra Group Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 603 (“Leong Hin Chuee”) (at [91]) that 
“the parties’ subsequent conduct … can be considered if evidentially 
probative” must also be doubted. Finally, the High Court’s use of 
subsequent conduct in Tienrui Design & Construction Pte Ltd v G & Y 
Trading and Manufacturing Pte Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 852 (at [49]) on the 
basis that it was “an appropriate case” to do so must certainly be treated 
with caution. 
12.36 In all of these cases, the High Court considered that subsequent 
conduct could be admitted for the purposes of contractual 
interpretation either on the basis that they satisfied the three 
Zurich Insurance criteria, or that they were “evidentially probative”. 
However, it is clear from the Court of Appeal’s pronouncement in 
Xia Zhengyan that the position in relation to the admissibility of 
subsequent conduct is very much open. Thus, it would be dangerous to 
conclude, in the absence of any pronouncement from the Court of 
Appeal, that such evidence is generally admissible. Until the Court of 
Appeal says otherwise, the safer view is that there is presently a 
prohibition against subsequent conduct for contractual interpretation 
under Singapore law. This accords with the more cautious approach 
taken by Quentin Loh J in the High Court decision of ARS (above, 
para 12.16), where his Honour (at [90]) expressed doubt about the use 
of subsequent conduct to prove the existence of a contract. 
12.37 Indeed, there seems to be another problem with admitting 
subsequent conduct even on a general basis. Even accepting that there is 
no blanket prohibition against subsequent conduct, and that the 
admissibility of such evidence is only governed by the Zurich Insurance 
criteria, Prakash J in the High Court decision of Ding Pei Zhen v 
Yap Son On [2015] 5 SLR 911 (“Ding Pei Zhen”) suggested that the 
application of those criteria would always result in the non-admissibility 
of subsequent conduct. In the learned judge’s view, the requirement of 
reasonable availability to all contracting parties in Zurich Insurance 
appears to refer to the extrinsic evidence being so available at the time of 
contracting. Similarly, the learned judge also pointed out that the 
requirement that there was a clear and obvious context seemingly refers 
to the context in which the contract was made. Thus, if correct, 
Prakash J thought that this meant that subsequent conduct could never 
satisfy the Zurich Insurance criteria and hence always be inadmissible. 
However, her Honour then thought that it is arguable that these 
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requirements are not intended to be “limited temporally”: Ding Pei Zhen 
at [95]. 
12.38 The admissibility of prior negotiations and subsequent conduct 
for the purposes of contractual interpretation continues to trouble the 
Singapore courts. It is suggested that the Singapore courts need to 
consider if there is any rationale that accounts for a blanket prohibition 
of both prior negotiations and subsequent conduct. It seems that the 
Court of Appeal in Xia Zhengyan did not think so: it acknowledged that 
prior negotiations, at least, can at times be useful and other times not so 
useful. The English decision of Inglis is a good example of when prior 
negotiations can at times be useful. If that is the case, then there is no 
good reason why there should be a blanket prohibition on the 
admissibility of such extrinsic evidence. Indeed, given that these 
evidence have not been taken out for special treatment within the EA, it 
has been argued that any blanket prohibition would actually be 
inconsistent with the terms of the EA and therefore void (see 
Goh Yihan, “The Case for Departing From the Exclusionary Rule 
Against Prior Negotiations in the Interpretation of Contracts in 
Singapore” (2013) 25 SAcLJ 182). The better view, it is submitted, is to 
treat prior negotiations and subsequent conduct just like any extrinsic 
evidence, subject to the three Zurich Insurance criteria and other 
common conditions for admission. It may be that their nature means 
that they will not be admissible in most cases, but that alone cannot 
justify a blanket prohibition against them. It may also be that, as pointed 
out by Prakash J in Ding Pei Zhen, that the Zurich Insurance criteria 
need to be adjusted so that they make sense in relation to subsequent 
conduct. Ultimately, in a time when the contextual approach towards 
contractual interpretation holds sway, it would be difficult to justify the 
exclusion of prior negotiations and subsequent conduct, which have 
been acknowledged to be useful in at least some contexts, based on their 
nature alone. 
Summary of the admissible evidence 
12.39 In light of the Singapore courts’ extensive discussion of the 
relevant admissible evidence for the purposes of contractual 
interpretation in 2015, it may be apposite to summarise the relevant 
principles. Broadly summarised, under Singapore law, extrinsic evidence 
that satisfy the four requirements of civil procedure in Sembcorp Marine 
and the three criteria in Zurich Insurance, and which are not prior 
negotiations or subsequent conduct, are admissible pursuant to 
proviso (f) to s 94 of the EA. 
12.40 The scope of proviso (f) to s 94 of the EA is restricted  
by ss 95–99 of the same Act. As was noted in Zurich Insurance (at [75]), 
these sections “embody the scope and limitation of proviso (f)”. 
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Sembcorp Marine expressed the same sentiment (at [50]), and 
regarded ss 93–100 as embodying a “strict” view on the admissibility of 
extrinsic evidence to influence the interpretation of a written document 
(which includes a contract). Thus, depending on the type of ambiguity 
identified by the extrinsic evidence admitted in the first instance,  
ss 95–99 operate to restrict the admissible extrinsic evidence used to 
discern a meaning other than the plain meaning of the contractual 
language: 
(a) The effect of s 95 is that, in the instances where patent 
ambiguity arises after the first consideration of the extrinsic 
evidence – either by the language used being obviously 
uncertain (though intelligible), or so defective as to be 
meaningless – no evidence may be given to cure the ambiguity. 
(b) Section 96, known as the “plain language provision”, is 
concerned with outward clarity, which arises because of the 
“plainness” of the language when applied to existing facts. In 
such cases, no evidence may be admitted to explain that the 
contractual language was not meant to apply to such facts. 
(c) Sections 97–99 concern latent ambiguity and provide 
instances where such ambiguity may be present. Latent 
ambiguity is one that “arise[s]… extrinsically in the application 
of an instrument of clear and definite intrinsic meaning to 
doubtful subject-matter” (see Thomas Starkie, A Practical 
Treatise on the Law of Evidence, and Digest of Proofs in Civil and 
Criminal Proceedings vol 3 (Stevens & Norton, 3rd Ed, 1842) 
at pp 755 and 768). 
12.41 There is some debate as to the type of extrinsic evidence that 
may be admitted under ss 97–99. Sembcorp Marine took the view that 
this could only be the drafter’s subjective declaration of intention. After 
an analysis of the prevailing case law at the time the Indian Evidence Act 
was drafted, it held that “extrinsic evidence in the form of parol evidence 
of the drafter’s intentions is generally inadmissible unless it can in some 
way be brought within the exceptions in ss 97 to 100”: Sembcorp Marine 
at [65(d)]. Zurich Insurance, on the other hand, did not take such a 
narrow view. 
Interpretative approach 
12.42 It is clear from Y.E.S. (above, para 12.19) and HSBC Trustee 
(above, para 12.20), among many other cases, that the interpretative 
approach to be adopted in Singapore is an objective one. In the 
High Court decision of Huationg (Asia) Pte Ltd v Lonpac Insurance Bhd 
[2015] SGHC 326 (“Huationg (Asia)”), George Wei J held (at [43]) that a 
contract is to be interpreted objectively and not by reference to the 
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subjective intentions of the parties. The process of interpretation, 
according to the learned judge, “is to identify and give effect to the 
parties’ intentions, objectively ascertained”: Huationg (Asia) at [44]. 
12.43 The interpretative approach is also a contextual one. This is, in 
many ways, informed by the general principles already discussed  
above (at paras 12.19–12.27 above). More specifically, Vinodh 
Coomaraswamy J’s comparison in HSBC Trustee of the context of a 
contract to a series of concentric circles of meaning is very helpful in 
understanding the essence of the contextual approach. 
12.44 In the learned judge’s view, the contextual approach starts with 
the innermost of the concentric circles of meaning: the natural and 
ordinary meaning of the words, phrases and sentences chosen by the 
parties to express their contractual intention in the document. But the 
interpretative exercise did not necessarily end there. The contextual 
approach could legitimately transition from the internal context to the 
external context if the extrinsic evidence was admissible. This must be 
read in the context of the Court of Appeal’s reminder in Y.E.S. that the 
text and context interact with one another. If, however, no extrinsic aids 
to construction were available, the court would be left with nothing but 
the words the parties themselves chose. This largely reproduces the 
effect of ss 95–99 of the EA, which places primacy on the plain meaning 
of the contractual words such that departure is only permissible in the 
presence of latent ambiguity. 
12.45 An example of the context-sensitive nature of the interpretative 
approach can be seen in Ding Pei Zhen (above, para 12.37). The contract 
sought to be interpreted in that case was not a formal document; it was, 
instead, “scribbled in Chinese on a page from another document 
immediately after a discussion between laypersons”: Ding Pei Zhen 
at [41]. In these circumstances, Judith Prakash J rightly regarded that it 
was important, in accordance with the guidance provided for by the 
Court of Appeal in Xia Zhengyan (above, para 12.31), to pay heed to the 
context in which the agreement had been made. A “common-sense” 
approach must be taken to interpretation in cases where persons whose 
first language is not English drafted the contract. As such, Prakash J 
in Ding Pei Zhen regarded that she had to consider the reasonable and 
probable expectations of the parties at the time the contract was made. 
This meant a deeper investigation into the background of the contract 
and not just the immediate context in which it was made. 
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Implication of terms 
Implication of terms in fact 
12.46 It is trite law that any implied term must not be inconsistent 
with the express terms of a contract. This was aptly demonstrated in the 
Court of Appeal decision of The One Suites Pte Ltd v Pacific Motor 
Credit (Pte) Ltd [2015] 3 SLR 695 (“The One Suites”). As was discussed 
in last year’s edition of the present work (see (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev 217 
at 229–230, paras 12.46–12.49), The One Suites concerned the sale and 
purchase of the remainder of the lease over a property. On 27 July 2012, 
the appellant exercised the option to purchase (“OTP”), having already 
paid a total sum of $1.68m to the respondent as deposit. However, the 
property could not change hands as it was sold subject to the “existing 
approved use”. Moreover, its sale was also subject to the written approval 
of the Housing and Development Board (“HDB”). In the event that 
HDB refuse to approve the sale of the property, then according to an 
express term of the OTP, “the sale … shall be rescinded and all moneys 
paid to account of the purchase price herein shall be refunded free of 
interest compensation”. 
12.47 The appellant sought HDB’s approval for the sale after the OTP 
was exercised. In addition, it also sought the approvals of other relevant 
authorities, such as the National Environment Agency (“NEA”). 
The NEA replied on 21 August 2012 that it was unable to support the 
proposed sale as the appellant’s proposed use did not conform with the 
long-term land use plan for the site on which the property sat. 
On 24 September 2012, HDB also replied to say that it was “unable to 
grant in-principle approval” because the “NEA’s consent has not been 
obtained”. 
12.48 The appellant then wrote to the respondent, saying that, 
following HDB’s rejection, the sale of the property had been “rescinded” 
and claimed for the refund of its $1.68m deposit. The respondent 
rejected this, saying that the appellant should appeal against NEA’s 
decision after revising its proposed use. When the appellant refused to 
do this, the respondent unilaterally wrote to the NEA asking it to reverse 
its earlier decision on the basis that there would be no change to the 
“existing use” of the property. The NEA approved the sale. However, 
when the appellant heard about this, it renounced the respondent’s 
unilateral appeal on its behalf and insisted on the refund of $1.68m on 
the basis that the transaction had been cancelled following HDB’s 
rejection. 
12.49 The legal issue was whether the appellant owed (and 
subsequently breached) a contractual duty to use all reasonable 
endeavours to secure HDB’s approval after HDB’s initial rejection. The 
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respondent argued that the appellant should have appealed against 
NEA’s rejection and then reapplied to HDB for approval. The appellant 
succeeded before the Court of Appeal. The court found that the HDB 
had in fact refused to approve the sale of the property on  
24 September 2012. Thus, the question was whether, following 
the HDB’s rejection, the appellant was under any further obligation to 
take further steps to obtain HDB’s approval, such as by lodging an 
appeal against HDB’s decision, or that of related entities (in this case, 
the NEA). 
12.50 While the court had no issue with there generally being an 
implied obligation to use reasonable endeavours to obtain the requisite 
approvals of relevant authorities, it did not think that this obligation 
should extend to taking further steps after any approval had been 
refused. This is especially true where there is an express term ending the 
contract following the initial rejection, as was the case in The One Suites. 
The OTP plainly provided that the sale shall be rescinded in the event 
the HDB refuses to approve the sale. Thus, once HDB refused to 
approve the sale, the OTP came to an end and the appellant came under 
no further obligation. There was thus certainly no implied term to take 
further steps, given that the express terms clearly went against any such 
term. 
12.51 Indeed, the result that no term should be implied is also reached 
by the application of the Court of Appeal’s three-step test for the 
implication of terms in fact laid down in Sembcorp Marine (above, 
para 12.19). Applying the first step would show that there was no gap in 
the contract to be filled since the parties had provided for when the 
contract was to come to an end. The second step would also not be 
satisfied as it was clearly not necessary in the business sense to imply a 
term as the parties had already provided for when the contract is to end 
by way of an express term. Another example of how the three-step test is 
to be applied can be found in Yeo Boong Hua v Turf Club Auto 
Emporium Pte Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 268 at [159]–[169]. 
Implied obligation to use reasonable obligations 
12.52 While the result in The One Suites could be explained by the 
inconsistency of the implied with the express terms of the contract, the 
Court of Appeal also held more broadly that there is no general 
obligation for a party to take further steps after an initial rejection. The 
court did not think that such a proposition was laid down in the 
High Court decision of Tan Soo Leng David v Wee, Satku & Kumar Pte 
Ltd [1997] 3 SLR(R) 257. Instead, it thought that the court in that case 
was simply saying that whether there was a duty to use reasonable 
endeavours after consent had been refused depended on the precise 
facts of each case. It may well be appropriate for a court to consider the 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
(2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev Contract Law 327 
 
steps taken after initial refusal where very little was done before the 
refusal. This would also be appropriate when it may be implied that 
parties have stipulated for such an obligation after rejection. However, 
even then this must yield to an express term. 
Implied term to co-operate 
12.53 Given the Court of Appeal’s decision as outlined above, there 
was no need to consider the respondent’s argument that there should be 
an implied duty of co-operation in the OTP. The court declined to 
express any definitive view on the permissibility of such an implied duty 
but it saw the potential relationship between such a duty and the 
doctrine of good faith. It regarded the doctrine of good faith to be a 
rather uncertain doctrine. As such, whether there is an implied duty to 
co-operate in law remains to be decided on another occasion, although 
it is clear that any argument on its permissibility would also have to 
address the permissibility of a wider doctrine of good faith than that 
which is currently accepted under Singapore contract law. 
12.54 Subsequently in the High Court decision of Tan Chin Hoon v 
Tan Choo Suan [2016] 1 SLR 1150, Coomaraswamy J accepted that the 
courts may imply a duty to co-operate into a contract where the object 
of the contract can be achieved only with the co-operation of both 
parties to the contract, citing Chitty on Contracts (Hugh G Beale gen ed) 
vol 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, 31st Ed, 2012) at para 13-012. The learned 
judge also recognised the “prevention principle”, which allows the courts 
to imply a term that a party will not do an act which, if done, would 
prevent the fulfilment of a condition on which the contract is 
predicated. Together, these principles will oblige a party to do what is 
reasonable in the circumstances to avoid the performance of the 
contract. 
12.55 Although the learned judge did not consider the Court of 
Appeal’s caution in The One Suites (above, para 12.46) regarding an 
implied term to co-operate, it is clear that his Honour was dealing with 
such an implied term on the facts of the case, rather than a general term 
implied by law, as was the case in The One Suites. Indeed, Vinodh 
Coomaraswamy J referenced Sembcorp Marine (above, para 12.19), 
which concerned terms implied in fact, and also quickly applied what 
seems to be the three-step framework prescribed in that case. 
Implied term of good faith 
12.56 Indeed, the position in Singapore, following Ng Giap Hon v 
Westcomb Securities Pte Ltd [2009] 3 SLR(R) 518 (“Ng Giap Hon”), is 
that there is no implied duty of good faith based on an implied term in 
law, although it might be possible for such a duty to be implied in fact. 
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This was accepted by the High Court in AREIF (Singapore I) Pte Ltd v 
NTUC Fairprice Co-operative Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 630, in which 
Coomaraswamy J held that AREIF did not owe any general contractual 
duty of good faith to NTUC. 
12.57 However, the learned judge did note that a more specific type of 
good faith clause is enforceable in Singapore. His Honour alluded to 
HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development 
Singapore Pte Ltd [2012] 4 SLR 738 (“HSBC Institutional Trust”), in 
which the Court of Appeal considered that a rent review clause that 
expressly required the parties “in good faith [to] endeavour to agree” 
was valid (discussed in (2012) 13 SAL Ann Rev 195 at 203–205, 
paras 12.33–12.38). It is nonetheless important to note, as the learned 
judge did, that the facts in HSBC Institutional Trust concerned a clause 
that obliged the parties to negotiate in good faith in the context of an 
existing contractual relationship. Indeed, where there is no existing 
contractual relationship, then the concept of a duty to carry out 
negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial 
position of the parties involved in negotiations (see Walford v Miles 
[1992] 2 AC 128 at 138). 
Implied term of mutual trust and confidence on discretionary bonus 
clauses 
12.58 In Leong Hin Chuee (above, para 12.35), two of the relevant 
issues were the construction of a discretionary bonus clause, and the 
effect that an implied term of mutual trust and confidence had on such a 
clause. As for the first issue, Tan Siong Thye J held (at [145]) that the 
construction of such clauses was carried out mainly through the 
processes of interpretation and implication. In so far as interpretation is 
concerned, that was carried out with regard to the context, There is 
therefore no absolute legal rule about how that discretion is to be 
exercised – it could be exercised in accordance with a general guidance, 
or it could be exercised unfettered. It all depended on the parties’ 
intention as objectively determined in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances. This should come as no surprise as discretionary bonus 
clauses, being an example of a contractual clause, should be interpreted 
in the same manner as other clauses, that is, contextually (as was 
discussed above). 
12.59 In so far as the effect of an implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence is concerned, Tan J accepted that such a term would be 
implied by law in Singapore, subject to express terms or the 
circumstances suggesting otherwise (see Cheah Peng Hock v Luzhou 
Bio-Chem Technology Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 577 at [59]). Such an implied 
term could affect the employer’s exercise of his discretion under a 
discretionary bonus clause, but whether this was the case, and if so, the 
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effect, all depended on the circumstances of the case. Thus, if the 
discretionary bonus clause, properly interpreted, reserved an “absolute” 
discretion to the employer, then an implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence will have little effect on the employer’s exercise of discretion. 
Otherwise, the effect of the implied term may be to oblige the employer 
to exercise his discretion in a bona fide and rational manner. 
Regulation of terms of the contract at common law 
12.60 Notwithstanding the general freedom of contracting parties to 
contract on terms that both have agreed to, the courts have at times seen 
it necessary to step in to regulate the terms of the contract. Nowhere is 
this more evident than the regulation of exception clauses. The courts’ 
regulation can be effected by the common law or by statute, specifically 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act (Cap 396, 1994 Rev Ed) (“UCTA”). 
“Red hand” rule 
12.61 It is established law that a person who signs a written document, 
knowing it to be a contract which governs the relations between him 
and the other party, will be bound by all its terms, including exception 
clauses. This will be the case even though the person concerned was, for 
some reason or other, ignorant of the contents of the document itself. 
Apart from the well-established exceptions premised on either fraud or 
misrepresentation (see, eg, Press Automation Technology Pte Ltd v 
Trans-Link Exhibition Forwarding Pte Ltd [2003] 1 SLR(R) 712 
(“Press Automation”)), there is a line of Canadian authorities that have 
held that onerous and unusual conditions cannot be incorporated by 
signature unless the attention of the party sought to be bound has been 
specifically drawn to them (see, eg, Trident Holdings Ltd v Danand 
Investments Ltd (1987) 21 CLR 240 and, on appeal (1988) 39 BLR 296; 
(1988) 49 DLR (4th) 1 and Tilden Rent-A-Car Co v Clendenning [1978] 
83 DLR 3d). 
12.62 More than a decade ago, the High Court in Press Automation 
rejected the Canadian line of cases. It held (at [40]) instead that where a 
party has signed a contract after having been given notice, by way of a 
clear incorporating clause, that party cannot afterwards assert that it is 
not bound by some of the terms on the ground that the same are 
onerous and unusual and had not been drawn specifically to its 
attention. This holding has now been reaffirmed in Huationg (Asia) 
(above, para 12.42), where George Wei J said (at [72]) that there “is no 
scope for the application of the red hand rule where there is a signed 
contract with an explicit incorporating clause” and that “[i]f the 
contracting parties do not ascertain their own legal positions before 
signing a contract, they will be bound by those terms except to the 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
330 SAL Annual Review (2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev 
 
extent that the Unfair Contract Terms Act (Cap 396, 1994 Rev Ed) offers 
them relief ”. 
Contra proferentem rule 
12.63 It is a canon of interpretation that doubt about the meaning of a 
contract is to be construed against the person who put them forward. 
This is the contra proferentem rule. As a general matter, Tan Siong Thye J 
in Leong Hin Chuee (above, para 12.35) clarified that the contra 
proferentem rule serves to protect weaker parties from an inequality of 
bargaining power, or who have no opportunity to negotiate the terms of 
an agreement. Similarly in Corinna Chin Shu Hwa v Hewlett-Packard 
Singapore (Sales) Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 204 (“Corinna Chin”), 
Edmund Leow JC accepted that the rule would apply where the “justice 
of the case demands it”, citing Kim Lewison, The Interpretation of 
Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2011) at p 367. 
12.64 These views accord with the general sentiments expressed in the 
recent English Court of Appeal decision of Compania Sud Americana de 
Vapores SA v Hin-Pro International Logistics Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 401 
(at [71]), where Christopher Clarke LJ adopted the rationale provided 
by Lord Mustill in Tam Wing Chuen v Bank of Credit and Commerce 
Hong Kong Ltd [1996] BCC 388 for the rule, as follows: “the basis of the 
contra proferentem principle is that a person, who puts forward the 
wording of a proposed agreement may be assumed to have looked after 
his own interests, so that if the words leave room for doubt about 
whether he is intended to have a particular benefit there is reason to 
suppose that he is not”. 
12.65 Under Singapore law, two questions must be considered when 
applying the contra proferentem rule: (a) was there any ambiguity in the 
contract; and (b) if so, who was the party against whom the clauses were 
to be interpreted against: see LTT Global Consultants v BMC Academy 
Pte Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 903 (“LTT Global”) at [56]–[57]. In relation to the 
first question, Leow JC in Corinna Chin cautioned that the rule must not 
be used to create a doubt or magnify an ambiguity. Where there is no 
difficulty in interpreting the contract, the contra proferentem rule should 
not be used by a court to prefer a particular interpretation; it is a canon 
of interpretation of “last resort”: Corinna Chin at [57]. Indeed, in 
Corinna Chin, Leow JC went through the interpretative process 
applicable in Singapore but still could not arrive at an appropriate 
interpretation of the words “new end user customer”. It was only then 
did his Honour turn to the contra proferentem rule. 
12.66 In relation to the second question, Tan J in Leong Hin Chuee 
held that it would not apply to a party to a bilaterally negotiated 
contract. The rule would also not apply to commercial men who have 
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the ability to protect their own interests. This therefore follows the 
approach taken by the High Court in LTT Global. It was held in that case 
that the proferens could either be the person who seeks to rely on the 
term or the person who proposed the term for inclusion in the contract. 
However, the court added that if the contract were bilaterally negotiated, 
then the contra proferentem rule would not apply. The court based this 
proposition on the English case of Levison v Farin [1978] 2 All ER 1149, 
which held that the contra proferentem rule is irrelevant where the clause 
“emerged as a result of joint efforts” (at p 1156). The court also relied on 
Kleinwort Benson v Malaysian Mining Corp Berhad [1988] 1 WLR 799, 
which agreed with Levison v Farin that the contra proferentem rule did 
not apply to a joint drafting effort. 
12.67 The High Court’s application of the contra proferentem rule in 
both Leong Hin Chuee and Corinna Chin therefore present no real 
problem under Singapore law. 
Regulation of terms of the contract under the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 
Koh Lin Yee and contracting out of the right of set-off 
12.68 The Court of Appeal in Koh Lin Yee v Terrestrial Pte Ltd [2015] 
2 SLR 497 (“Koh Lin Yee”) ruled that a contractual clause excluding a 
right of set-off is subject to the requirement of reasonableness in UCTA. 
In doing so, it also laid down some general guiding principles relating to 
the application of UCTA, namely, when a party is considered to be 
dealing “as consumer” under s 12(1), when a contract contains standard 
terms of business under s 3(1), and the application of the requirement of 
reasonableness. Each of these points will be considered below. 
12.69 The appellants in the two appeals before the Court of Appeal in 
Koh Lin Yee were Koh Lin Yee and Allgo Marine Pte Ltd, and the 
respondent was Terrestrial Pte Ltd. Koh is the sole director and owner of 
a single share in Allgo. On 25 May 2009, Allgo agreed to sell a flat top 
barge to Terrestrial for $1.2m. Although Terrestrial paid Allgo in full, 
Allgo failed to deliver the barge as it had itself failed to pay the barge 
builder an outstanding balance of $350,000. To facilitate the building of 
the barge, Terrestrial agreed to make two short-term loans to Allgo on 
3 January 2011. Koh also agreed unconditionally to guarantee Allgo’s 
obligations to repay these loans. Terrestrial later agreed to make another 
loan to Allgo. Allgo failed to make repayment of any of the loans by the 
stipulated due dates. Terrestrial thereafter demanded repayment from 
both Allgo, as well as Koh as guarantor of the loans. 
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12.70 In their defence against Terrestrial’s application for summary 
judgment, Koh and Allgo argued that Terrestrial had failed to pay 
moneys owed under a separate contract with Allgo for the purchase of a 
tug. This in turn rendered Koh and Allgo unable to repay their 
outstanding loans to Terrestrial. As such, Koh and Allgo argued that 
they were entitled to set-off the moneys due under their loans to 
Terrestrial against the sum owed to them for the tug. The difficulty with 
the possibility of a set-off was clause 12.2 of the loan agreements 
between Allgo and Terrestrial, which read as follows: 
“All payments to be made by [Allgo or Koh] under the [loan 
agreements] shall be made without set-off, counterclaim or condition 
…” 
12.71 The Court of Appeal thus had to consider whether clause 12.2 
explicitly excluded Koh’s and Allgo’s right to raise a set-off or 
counterclaim through the words “without set-off ”. And if clause 12.2 did 
have this effect, the follow-up issue was whether it is an unfair contract 
term within the meaning of UCTA and therefore subject to the 
requirement of reasonableness prescribed by that Act. 
12.72 In respect of the interpretation of clause 12.2, the Court of 
Appeal held that, in accordance with the freedom of contract, parties 
can agree to contract out of the right of set-off if clearly expressed. It is a 
matter of interpretation whether the words used in the contract 
sufficiently evince an intention to exclude the right to set-off. Applying 
these principles to the facts, the Court of Appeal found that the words 
“without set-off ” effectively excluded all forms of set-off, with no 
distinction between legal and equitable set-offs. 
Dealing “as consumer” and “standard terms of business” 
12.73 The Court of Appeal consequently had to consider ss 3 and 12 
of UCTA, which are reproduced below for easy reference: 
Liability arising in contract 
3.—(1) This section applies as between contracting parties where one 
of them deals as consumer or on the other’s written standard terms of 
business. 
(2) As against that party, the other cannot by reference to any 
contract term — 
(a) when himself in breach of contract, exclude or 
restrict any liability of his in respect of the breach; or 
(b) claim to be entitled — 
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(i) to render a contractual performance 
substantially different from that which was 
reasonably expected of him; or 
(ii) in respect of the whole or any part of his 
contractual obligation, to render no performance at 
all, 
except in so far as (in any of the cases mentioned in this subsection) 
the contract term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. 
… 
Dealing as consumer 
12.—(1) A party to a contract “deals as consumer” in relation to 
another party if — 
(a) he neither makes the contract in the course of a 
business nor holds himself out as doing so; 
(b) the other party does make the contract in the course 
of a business; and 
(c) in the case of a contract governed by the law of sale 
of goods or hire-purchase, or by section 7, the goods passing 
under or in pursuance of the contract are of a type ordinarily 
supplied for private use or consumption. 
(2) But on a sale by auction or by competitive tender the buyer is 
not in any circumstances to be regarded as dealing as consumer. 
(3) Subject to this, it is for those claiming that a party does not 
deal as consumer to show that he does not. 
12.74 As can be seen, in order for s 3 to apply, it has first to be shown 
either that one of the contracting parties “deals as consumer” or that one 
of the contracting parties deals “on the other’s written standard terms of 
business”. And if, either one (or both) of the two threshold requirements 
is satisfied, in order to bring the exception clause within the scope of s 3, 
it has to be proved that the clause concerned falls within at least one of 
the following categories, which are found in ss 3(2)(a), 3(2)(b)(i) 
and 3(2)(b)(ii) respectively, and such a clause would be inoperative only 
if it did not satisfy the “requirement of reasonableness”. 
12.75 The appellants argued that s 3 applied to clause 12.2 and that 
clause 12.2 was unreasonable and thereby inoperative. In order to do so, 
Allgo and Koh first had to show that either of the threshold 
requirements was met in order to invoke s 3. 
12.76 First, Allgo and Koh submitted that they were dealing “as 
consumer” as they were not represented at the time the loan agreements 
were signed and Terrestrial was engaged in financing or lending money 
to them. In response, the Court of Appeal pointed out that the 
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requirements in ss 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b) are cumulative. The starting 
point is the English Court of Appeal decision of R & B Customs Brokers 
Co Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 321, in which 
Dillon LJ read the phrase “in the course of business” under ss 12(1)(a) 
and 12(1)(b) to mean that the transaction in question was a “clearly 
integral” part of the company’s business, as opposed to being merely 
incidental to such business. In addition, a “degree of regularity” is 
needed before a particular transaction could be regarded a “clearly 
integral” part of the business. 
12.77 Applying this definition to the facts, the Court of Appeal found 
that Allgo’s obtaining of a loan was merely incidental to its carrying out 
of its business. Although Terrestrial adduced evidence that Allgo had 
intended to obtain financing from banks, there was no evidence 
pointing to the regularity required to constitute a course of business. 
Hence, Allgo was not contracting in the course of business and fulfilled 
the requirement under s 12(1)(a). 
12.78 However, this was not the end of the matter as s 12(1)(b) 
required Terrestrial to have contracted in the course of a business. This 
the Court of Appeal did not find satisfied as Terrestrial could not be said 
to have made the loans in the course of a business; in other words, the 
loans were not integral to Terrestrial’s business, which was certainly not 
to make loans. 
12.79 Because the requirements under ss 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b) are 
cumulative, and s 12(1)(b) was not satisfied, Allgo failed to prove that it 
had dealt “as consumer” under UCTA. The result is that s 3 could not be 
invoked. As a practical matter, this part of the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment now provides very clear guidance in the context of Singapore 
law as to the application of ss 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b). 
Standard terms of business 
12.80 Alternatively, the Court of Appeal also considered that the loan 
agreements did not contain any standard terms of business within the 
meaning of s 3(1). The starting point is the English High Court decision 
of Hadley Design Associates v Westminster [2003] EWHC 1617 (TCC). 
In that case, Judge Richard Seymour QC considered that the phrase 
“standard terms of business” means a set of terms in the written form 
existing prior to the making of the agreement, which was intended to be 
adopted more or less automatically in respect of transactions of a 
particular type without any significant opportunity for negotiations. 
This was not the case on the facts since the loan agreements were drawn 
up specifically to deal with certain circumstances that had arisen, that is, 
Allgo could not pay for the construction of the barge. 
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12.81 Again, because the alternative threshold requirement under s 3 
was not satisfied, s 3 could not be invoked. Nonetheless, for 
completeness, the Court of Appeal went on to consider, on assumption 
that either (or both) threshold requirements was satisfied, whether s 3 
could apply to clause 12.2, being a contractual clause excluding a right of 
set-off. 
Application of s 3 of UCTA to a clause excluding right of set-off 
12.82 The Court of Appeal held that s 3 of UCTA could apply to a 
contractual clause excluding the right of set-off which, in this case, was 
clause 12.2. 
12.83 There are two opposing views on this issue. On the one hand, it 
has been considered that clauses such as clause 12.2 merely define the 
contractual obligation between the parties and therefore fell outside the 
ambit of UCTA. On the other hand, as accepted by the Court of Appeal, 
such clauses are considered to restrict the rights and remedies of the 
party who would otherwise have been entitled to rely on the set-off and 
therefore fell within the ambit of UCTA. In preferring the second view, 
the Court of Appeal accepted the reasoning of the English Court of 
Appeal in Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] 1 QB 600 
(“Stewart Gill”), which dealt with the following clause: 
The customer shall not be entitled to withhold payment of any amount 
due to the company under the contract by reason of any payment 
credit set off counterclaim allegation of incorrect or defective goods or 
for any other reason whatsoever which the customer may allege 
excuses him from performing his obligations hereunder. 
12.84 Lord Donaldson MR held that this clause came within s 3 of the 
UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (c 50) because it came within the 
varieties of exemption clauses set out in s 13 covered by s 3. Section 13 
of the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (c 50), which is 
in pari materia with s 13 of UCTA, reads as follows: 
Varieties of exemption clause 
13.—(1) To the extent that this Part prevents the exclusion or 
restriction of any liability it also prevents — 
(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to 
restrictive or onerous conditions; 
(b) excluding or restricting any right or remedy in 
respect of the liability, or subjecting a person to any prejudice 
in consequence of his pursuing any such right or remedy; 
(c) excluding or restricting rules of evidence or 
procedure, 
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and (to that extent) sections 2 and 5 to 7 also prevent excluding or 
restricting liability by reference to terms and notices which exclude or 
restrict the relevant obligation or duty. 
12.85 Thus, according to Lord Donaldson MR, and pursuant to the 
terms of s 13(1)(b), the clause in Stewart Gill excluded the defendants’ 
“right” to set off their claims against the plaintiffs’ claim and further 
excluded the “remedy” which they otherwise would have been able to 
bring by means of a set-off. Furthermore, this clause also excluded or 
restricted the procedural rules as to set-off pursuant to the terms of 
s 13(1)(c). Thus, on either account, the clause, or indeed, any clause 
excluding the right of set-off, would come within s 3 of UCTA, being a 
variety of exemption clause caught by UCTA. The Court of Appeal in 
Koh Lin Yee (above, para 12.68) accepted this reasoning as correct. This, 
with respect, must be correct. On a plain reading of the section, it is 
clear that clauses that exclude the right of set-off would come within its 
ambit. To construe it otherwise would be to ignore the clear meaning 
and (more importantly) the purpose of the section. 
12.86 The Court of Appeal also accepted that the reasoning in 
Stewart Gill did not affect the rights of parties to agree to include no 
set-off clauses in that contract that cover specific circumstances. 
Whether they have such an effect and whether they attract the 
application of UCTA is a wholly separate matter. 
Application of the requirement of reasonableness to clauses that exclude 
right of set-off 
12.87 As to the relevant factors to determining the reasonableness of 
clauses that exclude the right of set-off, the Court of Appeal considered 
that such clauses have a clear rationale, namely, that it may be important 
for cash flow reasons that a party should receive payment in full under a 
contract so that the counterparty should be required to seek its right of a 
set-off in separate proceedings. From this starting point, the relevant 
factors are those enunciated in Second Sched of UCTA, even though the 
Act provides that they only apply to ss 6 and 7 of the Act. 
12.88 In relation to the relative bargaining strength of the parties, 
whether or not the party impugning the exception clause concerned is 
experienced is a significant factor that the courts will take into account. 
The guiding principle seems to be that an experienced commercial party 
would not be taken advantage of and hence any exception clause entered 
into by it is likely to be reasonable. Also, whether the clause concerned is 
well known or accepted in commercial circles will be an important 
factor. Finally, the availability of legal advice would be important. 
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12.89 On the assumption that s 3 covered clause 12.2 in the present 
case, the Court of Appeal considered that it was reasonable since the 
parties were of relatively equal bargaining positions, and since it was a 
common provision in the context of a loan facility. 
Unresolved issue 
12.90 The Court of Appeal expressly left unresolved the issue of 
whether a clause excluding the right of set-off would be considered in 
full or in part when subjected to the requirement of reasonableness. In 
other words, would the part of the clause excluding the right of set-off 
be severed and assessed separately, or would the entire clause be 
assessed altogether? The answer to this question had practical 
consequences in Stewart Gill (above, para 12.83). In deciding to subject 
the whole of the affected clause to the requirement of reasonableness, 
the English Court of Appeal made it much harder for the clause to be 
found reasonable. This was because the rest of the clause was couched 
very extensively, regardless of whether the exclusion of the right of 
set-off itself was phrased as extensively. It is conceivable that had the 
exclusion of the right of set-off be severed and assessed separately, it 
might have been found to be reasonable. 
12.91 It is perhaps understandable why the Court of Appeal elected to 
leave this issue open since the parties did not argue it. However, it might 
be thought that the rationale behind the doctrine of severance might 
apply to govern this issue, that is, if severance does not alter the 
meaning of the clause, then there is no reason why the exception clause 
cannot be assessed only on its exclusion or restriction part. 
Vitiating factors 
Misrepresentation 
12.92 Although a party alleging fraud in a civil suit needs only to 
prove the same on a balance of probabilities, the burden of proof is 
nevertheless an onerous one given the particular gravity of the charge as 
well as the more liberal measure of damages it entails: see Wee Chiaw 
Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve [2013] 3 SLR 801 at [30]–[31]. It is 
therefore unsurprising that a plea of fraudulent misrepresentation may 
often fail for want of evidence. In Goldrich Venture Pte Ltd v Halcyon 
Offshore Pte Ltd [2015] 3 SLR 990, the plaintiffs were “resident 
contractors” who had entered into various labour supply contracts with 
the defendant. Purportedly acting pursuant to these contracts, the 
plaintiffs brought in more than 600 foreign workers but failed to deploy 
them in any project. The matter was eventually investigated by the 
Ministry of Manpower, which led to Lee’s (the plaintiffs’ shareholder and 
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sole director) conviction for multiple offences under the relevant 
employment statutes. In the present suit, the plaintiffs sought to recover 
substantial damages from the defendant on the ground that they had 
entered into the labour supply agreements in reliance on the fraudulent 
misrepresentations of the defendant’s agent, Choo. These 
representations were first, that the defendant had secured large marine 
projects for 2008; second, each worker would be deployed in their 
projects upon payment of a “service fee”; and third, that they (the 
plaintiffs) should continue to bring the workers to Singapore so they 
could start work as soon as the projects became available. 
12.93 At trial, Steven Chong J found (at [104]) that none of the 
representations were made out as there was “a complete paucity of 
documentary evidence or corroborative testimony” and Lee’s evidence 
was riddled with both internal and external inconsistencies. 
Importantly, Chong J also observed (at [78]) that a plaintiff ’s burden of 
proof is not discharged simply by demonstrating the implausibility of 
the defendant’s case. This is particularly so if there was a third 
explanation in addition to those raised by the parties, so that a rejection 
of the defendant’s case does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that 
the plaintiff ’s case is true. In this case, Chong J thought it probable 
that Lee had together with Choo and Ong (the defendant’s “labour 
consultant”) devised a scheme to profit from bringing foreign workers 
to Singapore. Their plan was to share among themselves the service fees 
paid by the workers, and then reap further profits when they are 
deployed in the marine sector. However, the scheme imploded when the 
financial crisis erupted in 2008. The plaintiffs were then left stranded 
with more than 600 workers to house and feed but no project for which 
they could be deployed. On this postulation, the weaknesses of the 
defendant’s case were not a sufficient basis for accepting the plaintiffs’ 
account. 
12.94 Fraudulent misrepresentation was also unsuccessfully pleaded 
in Xia Zhengyan (above, para 12.31). We have already considered  
this case in connection with contractual interpretation (see  
paras 12.31–12.38 above). Apart from alleging breach of contract, the 
appellant in this case also sought to recover damages on the ground that 
the sale and purchase contract was induced by the respondent’s 
fraudulent representations. For this purpose, she identified no less  
than 22 (allegedly) false statements, all of which the trial judge found to 
be non-actionable. The Court of Appeal affirmed this holding (though 
not without some reservation as to its correctness in respect of two 
particular statements) but also took the opportunity to caution 
(Xia Zhengyan at [100]) against the “scatter-shot or kitchen-sink” 
approach of pleading a long and indiscriminate list of allegedly false 
representations in the mistaken belief that one’s prospect of success 
increases in tandem with the number of claims or allegations that one 
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makes. The plaintiff might have been guilty of this when she included in 
her pleadings various representations of a trifling nature. 
12.95 In Tiong Swee Eng v Yeo Khee Siang [2015] 3 SLR 1141 
(“Tiong Swee Eng”), the High Court clarified that settlement agreements 
made in contemplation of divorce are merely a species of contracts to 
which the general contractual principles apply. Judith Prakash J saw no 
reason why a different treatment ought to be accorded to such 
agreements. In this case, the plaintiff wife and defendant husband had 
entered into an agreement to settle their matrimonial assets. However, 
the plaintiff developed misgivings soon after, and the parties 
subsequently discovered that some matrimonial assets had been omitted 
from the agreement. The plaintiff then brought proceedings to rescind 
the agreement on the grounds, inter alia, that the defendant had 
misrepresented the list of assets included in the agreement (“Asset List”) 
as a complete list of their matrimonial assets, as well as the failure to 
disclose “facts and circumstances [that] would have been likely to 
influence a prudent person in entering into a transaction or requiring an 
amendment of the terms, or simply ‘given him pause’” (the 
“non-disclosure argument”): Tiong Swee Eng at [52]. At the conclusion 
of the trial, Prakash J found that the representation as to the Asset List 
was in fact false as it had omitted a property held in their joint names. 
However, this was not a deliberate omission as both parties had honestly 
forgotten about the property at the time of the negotiation. Satisfied that 
the plaintiff had relied on the misrepresentation, the court went on to 
consider the appropriate remedy. Exercising the discretion conferred 
by s 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed), the 
learned judge declined to order rescission as it would be a 
disproportionate response on the facts. Though actionable, the 
misrepresentation in question was not one that went to the heart of the 
agreement because the property made up only slightly more than 1% of 
the total assets settled and more importantly, the plaintiff had not 
suffered any harm as her interests as a joint owner remained intact. On 
the other hand, there was little advantage to be gained through 
rescission as the parties would then be thrown back into litigation with 
scant likelihood that a better outcome could be achieved. As there was 
no evidence that she would personally benefit had the property been 
included in the settlement, the plaintiff was awarded only nominal 
damages in lieu of rescission. This aspect of the judgement serves as a 
rare but important illustration of the circumstances in which a court 
would decline to order rescission under s 2(2) of the Misrepresentation 
Act. 
12.96 In the course of her reasoning, Prakash J also made a number of 
other useful observations. First, her Honour confirmed that an operative 
representation may arise even if it has only been conveyed to the 
representee’s agent. So long as the representation was made to the agent 
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in circumstances where it is clear that it is meant to be relied upon by 
the principal, the representor must be taken to have represented to the 
principal. Thus, the learned judge found in Tiong Swee Eng that the 
defendant could be said to have represented the Asset List to be 
complete even though this representation was made only to the 
plaintiff ’s solicitor. Secondly, precisely what evidence is needed to 
establish the making of a representation must be determined by the 
substance of that representation. In this case, Prakash J held it was not 
necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the individual items on the list 
had been communicated to her. Since the essence of the representation 
was that the list comprised (to the best of the defendant’s knowledge and 
belief) their matrimonial assets at that time, all that has to be proved is 
the fact that the veracity of the list was communicated to her. Thirdly, 
Prakash J exposed the fallacy of the non-disclosure argument, which 
presupposes that a contracting party owes a general duty to disclose any 
information relevant to the counter party’s decision to contract. Such a 
suggestion is clearly antithetical to the principle of caveat emptor in 
contract law. While a legal duty to disclose may be imposed in 
exceptional circumstances, Prakash J found that the settlement 
agreement did not fall into any of these excepted categories. It is also 
true that a positive duty to disclose may be justified in novel 
circumstances to protect parties with particular vulnerabilities. But it 
seems reasonably clear that Prakash J did not think that a settlement 
made in contemplation of divorce involves any such novel interests. 
Instead, her Honour thought (at [62]) that such a duty would be highly 
unrealistic in the context of divorce, where the parties are “adversaries, 
each of whom is seeking their own advantage”. 
Mistake 
12.97 Ordinarily, a person who signed a contract is bound even if he 
has not read or did not understand it. To this, the plea of non est factum 
provides a limited exception. It allows a person who has signed a 
document to deny his signature if the document is, through no fault of 
his, radically different from what he believed it to be. In the early 
authorities, the doctrine was applied mainly in favour of illiterate or 
blind parties but has in modern times been extended to other forms of 
incapacity. Notwithstanding that, it is clear that the doctrine has to be 
kept within narrow bounds, for intolerable uncertainty would ensue if 
contracting parties should be allowed to escape their contractual 
commitments simply by asserting that they had not understood what 
was signed. For this reason, the application of the defence is subject to 
strict conditions, the stringency of which would normally preclude 
reliance by persons who are adult and literate. 
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12.98 Against that backdrop, the Court of Appeal’s readiness to set 
aside a deed on the ground of non est factum in Mahidon Nichiar bte 
Mohd Ali v Dawood Sultan Kamaldin [2015] 5 SLR 62 (“Mahidon (CA)”) 
is both noteworthy and exceptional. In this case, the appellants were 
three siblings who had signed a deed (the “RBI Deed”) renouncing their 
beneficial interests in their father’s estate in favour of their mother and 
brother (Dawood). On the basis of this deed, the family home (“the 
Property”) was transferred to the joint names of mother and Dawood 
in 2005. However, the appellants were apparently unaware of this 
development until 2011, whereupon they promptly lodged a caveat 
against the Property. Subsequently, in 2013, they commenced 
proceedings against Dawood to set aside the transfer and to rectify the 
land register. Their case was that they had agreed only to renounce their 
interests in favour of their mother and had signed the RBI Deed in the 
(mistaken) belief that that was its effect. Dawood, on the other hand, 
argued that the appellants had agreed to waive their interests to benefit 
both mother and himself as joint tenants. 
12.99 In the High Court, the judge found that neither the appellants 
nor Dawood had proven their version of the pre-deed agreement: 
Mahidon Nichiar bte Mohd Ali v Dawood Sultan Kamaldin [2014] 
4 SLR 1309. That being the case, the appellants’ argument that  
the RBI Deed was a breach of their prior agreement failed, and the issue 
that remained was whether there was some other ground for setting 
aside the RBI Deed. The judge concluded there was none. In particular, 
his Honour rejected non est factum and unilateral mistake as possible 
bases for vitiating the RBI Deed as he had found that the appellants, 
having had the effects of the deed explained to them, was not mistaken 
as to the nature and effects of the document. 
12.100 Critically, however, this last-mentioned finding was reversed on 
appeal. The Court of Appeal found, instead, that the appellants had 
executed the RBI Deed in the mistaken belief that it sought only to 
appoint Dawood as the sole administrator of their father’s estate. In its 
view, this was the more probable explanation since there was no other 
convincing reason why the appellants would have renounced their 
interests in favour of Dawood. Importantly, the court found that the 
appellants’ error was engendered by their inability to understand the 
complex documents they were signing. While such deficiency would 
ordinarily be cured by obtaining proper legal advice, the appellants did 
not have the benefit of such advice as the solicitors acting for them were 
concurrently acting for Dawood and was oblivious to the potential 
conflicts of interests between them. Consequently, they took 
instructions only from Dawood without verifying with the appellants 
and did not at any point draw the appellants’ attention time to the 
adverse effects of the deed. Overall, the Court of Appeal found that the 
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solicitors failed spectacularly in the discharge of their duties to the 
appellants. 
12.101 To the extent those findings established the appellants’ mistaken 
state of mind when executing the RBI Deed, they appear to justify its 
avoidance on the basis of an operative unilateral mistake (unilateral in 
the sense that the appellants’ mistake was known to Dawood, who stood 
to benefit under the deed). However, the Court of Appeal (at [80]) did 
not predicate its decision on the ground of mistake alone, but on the 
distinct principle that: 
[Where], in a given matter, a solicitor acts for multiple clients (or 
groups of clients) with conflicting interests, and where one client (or 
group of clients) enters into a transaction which prejudices him and 
benefits the conflicting interests of another client (or group of clients) 
who is also represented by the same solicitor, that transaction will be 
regarded as suspect and will be liable to be set aside in the absence of 
clear evidence that the solicitor did in fact fully advise the client (or 
group of clients) who was prejudiced as to the terms and effect of the 
transaction. [emphasis in original] 
12.102 Although this passage may, at first blush, suggest that deficient 
legal advice in the context of concurrent legal representation is per se a 
sufficient vitiating factor, it is submitted that the better view is to 
understand it as an instance where the failure of legal advice confirmed 
the appellants’ error as an operative mistake (rendering the RBI Deed 
void ab initio) or that the lawyers’ omission was a breach of fiduciary 
duty or a misrepresentation of which Dawood had actual or 
constructive notice, thereby justifying the rescission of the RBI Deed. 
Some support for these explanations can indeed be found in the 
authorities cited by Sundaresh Menon CJ in support of this principle, 
viz, Sturge v Sturge (1849) 1 Beav 229 and Bank of Montreal v Jane 
Jacques Stuart [1911] AC 120, both concerned with undue influence, 
and Willis v Barron [1902] AC 271, a case involving an operative 
mistake. 
12.103 More interestingly, perhaps, the Court of Appeal also held in the 
alternative that the appellants could also have succeeded on the ground 
of non est factum. Affirming the traditional conditions for the doctrine’s 
application, the court found that there was a radical difference between 
what the appellants thought they were signing (renouncing their rights 
to administer their father’s estate in favour of Dawood) and what they in 
fact signed (renouncing their beneficial interests in the estate in favour 
of Dawood). In addition, the court was also satisfied that the appellants 
had not been negligent, since it was entirely reasonable for the 
appellants – “a group of lay and unsophisticated clients” – to have relied 
on their solicitors for advice when executing documents forming part of 
a complicated arrangement: Mahidon (CA) at [122]. 
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12.104 On this reasoning, the Court of Appeal was plainly attempting 
to do no more than apply non est factum in its conventionally narrow 
form. However, the court’s finding that the appellants had exercised due 
care by relying on their solicitors may signify a departure from the 
orthodox view that a plaintiff who has done no more than rely on a 
trusted person or legal advisor would not usually succeed in a plea of 
non est factum. This is because ordinarily, a plaintiff who is literate and 
otherwise of normal capacity is expected to take some steps to ascertain 
the meaning and effects of what he is about to sign. The point is 
cogently made by Lord Reid in Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1970] 
3 WLR 1078 at 1082, where his Lordship observed: 
The plea [of non est factum] cannot be available to anyone who was 
content to sign without taking the trouble to try to find out at least the 
general effect of the document. Many people do frequently sign 
documents put before them for signature by their solicitor or other 
trusted advisers without making any inquiry as to their purpose or 
effect. But the essence of the plea of non est factum is that the person 
signing believed that the document he signed had one character or 
one effect whereas in fact its character or effect was quite different. He 
could not have such a belief unless he had taken steps or been given 
information which gave him some grounds for his belief. The amount of 
information he must have and the sufficiency of the particularity of 
his belief must depend on the circumstances of each case. [emphasis 
added] 
12.105 Because the Court of Appeal in Mahidon (CA) (above, 
para 12.98) was largely focused on what the solicitors ought to have 
done (and in the event failed to do) when acting for multiple clients, 
there was little consideration of what steps the appellants took to verify 
the purpose and effects of the RBI Deed. As a result, there is 
considerable uncertainty as to whether the applicants had taken any step 
at all in that direction. On the assumption that that they were 
completely passive, it would seem that Mahidon (CA) might have 
lowered the threshold for the application of the non est factum doctrine, 
so that in cases involving lay clients, the validity of complex transactions 
may ultimately turn on the quality of the legal advice they received. 
12.106 Fortunately, however, the expansionary effects just surmised 
need not follow once it is appreciated that Mahidon (CA) is not in fact a 
paradigm case for the application of non est factum. Traditionally, the 
doctrine is only of significance in contexts where a mistakenly signed 
document has been relied on by unsuspecting third parties. A classic 
example would be where A misleads B to sign a document, 
which A then uses to obtain an advantage from C. In a suit between B 
and C, the question would arise as to whether B may disown his 
signature on the ground of non est factum. Significantly, the requirement 
for due care on the part of the mistaken signor was developed in such 
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contexts to reflect the policy that as between two innocent parties, the 
signor is in a better position than the third party to guard against the 
risk of fraud or error. Where, however, no innocent third party is 
affected, this policy is not engaged so the requirement for due care on 
the part of the signor is not strictly relevant: see Petelin v Cullen (1975) 
132 CLR 355. 
12.107 Mahidon (CA) was not a case where the RBI Deed had been 
relied on by an innocent third party to his detriment. Instead, the 
appellants were seeking to set aside the deed against Dawood, who was 
at all times privy to the appellants’ error. In such circumstance, the 
appellants would ordinarily be entitled to relief on the ground of 
misrepresentation or mistake. Perhaps owing to evidential or difficulties 
not made explicit in the judgment, the appellants had chosen instead to 
plead non est factum. This is by no means impermissible, but it is 
important then to bear in mind that its application in such context may 
differ from, and should not be extended to, that which involves innocent 
third parties. 
Illegality 
12.108 The doctrine of maintenance and champerty is a settled feature 
of the common law but its application has evolved significantly over 
time. Hostility towards contracts that maintain or assist with litigation 
has abated in tandem with growing recognition of their importance as a 
means to promote wider access to justice. Indeed, third party litigation 
funding is now a thriving industry in Australia and is also gaining 
acceptance in the UK. 
12.109 Against that backdrop, the High Court’s confirmation in 
Re Vanguard Energy Pte Ltd [2015] 4 SLR 597 (“Vanguard Energy”) that 
an agreement assigning the fruits of a legal action is not void for 
champerty is of undoubted significance. In this case, the shareholders of 
an insolvent company, Vanguard Energy Pte Ltd, had agreed to fund the 
company’s various actions for breach of contract. For this purpose, the 
liquidators entered into an agreement (“the Assignment Agreement”) 
with the shareholder-funders, pursuant to which the latter agreed to 
fund part of the litigation cost in exchange for an assignment of a part of 
the recovery equal in amount to the funds so provided. On the 
liquidators’ application, Chua Lee Meng JC confirmed that the 
agreement did not offend the doctrine of maintenance and champerty. 
This was because the proceeds of litigation constituted corporate 
“property” that the liquidators were empowered to dispose of 
under s 272(2)(c) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed). Since 
such a disposal was statutorily authorised, there could be no question 
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that it offended the common law rule against maintenance and 
champerty. 
12.110 Though that was sufficient to dispose of the application, 
Chua JC went on to consider whether the Assignment Agreement would 
otherwise be struck down as champertous at common law and 
concluded it would not. In deciding this issue, Chua JC found (at [43]) 
that the authorities validated the assignment of a bare cause of action (or 
the fruits of such action) if: 
(a) it is incidental to a transfer of property; or 
(b) the assignee has a legitimate interest in the outcome of 
the litigation; or 
(c) there is no realistic possibility that the administration of 
justice may suffer as a result of the assignment. 
12.111 Chua JC observed (at [43]) that while (a) and (b) are well 
established exceptions to the general rule, (c) embraces a broader 
approach that requires the court to weigh the relevant and competing 
policy concerns, namely: 
(a) whether the assignment conflicts with existing public 
policy that is directed to protecting the purity of justice or the 
due administration of justice, and the interests of vulnerable 
litigants; and 
(b) the policy in favour of ensuring access to justice. 
12.112 Applying this last test to the facts, Chua JC found that there was 
nothing in the Assignment Agreement that rendered it objectionable on 
policy grounds. In particular, there was no risk of compromising the 
purity of justice or the interests of the claimant since the liquidators 
retained full control of the proceedings and the funders’ consent was 
only required for the choice of solicitors and the settlement or 
discontinuance of claims. At the same time, the agreement entails clear 
benefits: the company would be able to pursue various claims which it 
could not otherwise do, and the recovery (not being illusory) would 
augment the assets distributable to creditors. The fact that the funders 
would recover no more than what they had actually expended, and only 
after the company has been repaid for the amount it co-funded, was 
another factor that weighed in favour of upholding the agreement. 
Clearly, therefore, the Assignment Agreement would materially enhance 
the company’s access to justice with little or no adverse effect on the 
course of justice. In addition, Chua JC was also prepared to uphold the 
agreement on the more traditional ground that the funders, not being 
disinterested third parties but shareholders and residual owners of the 
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company’s assets, would undoubtedly have legitimate interests in the 
successful prosecution of the company’s claims. 
12.113 Vanguard Energy is, in one sense, a straightforward case because 
the assignment in question was made in the context of corporate 
insolvency. The benefits of litigation funding in this context are 
particularly well-recognised: any risk of abuse or exploitation is 
minimised through the mediation of insolvency practitioners who are 
not only well-versed in legal issues but are also legally obliged, as 
fiduciaries, to negotiate for such terms as would best promote the 
company’s (ie, creditors’) interests. Indeed, it is for these reasons that 
even third party litigation funding for insolvent companies is 
uncontroversial in leading jurisdictions such as UK and Australia. Seen 
against this background, the result in Vanguard Energy appears 
unremarkable: it did no more than affirm a settled practice. 
12.114 What is less clear, and more pertinent for present purposes, is 
whether Chua JC’s observations also signified the dawn of a more 
flexible policy-based approach in the general application of the doctrine. 
To recall, Chua JC had expounded the balancing of competing policies 
as one test for determining whether an agreement savoured of 
maintenance and/or champerty. However, his Honour’s exposition of 
this approach suggests that it is an overriding, rather than merely an 
alternative, test. That would mean, for instance, that it is not always 
sufficient to establish that the funder has legitimate interests in the 
claims being pursued. Even if such interests exist, it may sometimes still 
be necessary to ask whether the agreement does in fact conflict with the 
policy concerns underlying the doctrine of maintenance and champerty. 
This may be demonstrated, as Chua JC did, by the facts of  
R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government 
and the Regions (No 8) [2003] QB 381. There, a firm of accountants 
agreed to fund its clients’ legal suits when the latter could no longer 
afford to do so. As these clients owed the firm unpaid accounting fees, 
the firm, as a substantial creditor, clearly had legitimate interests in the 
successful prosecution of the legal suits. Nevertheless, this was not a 
factor that aided its case, since those same interests may also tempt it to 
influence the outcome of the litigation. Instead, it was on the basis of 
other evidence that the English Court of Appeal concluded that the 
funding agreements would not tempt the accountants to interfere in the 
legal proceedings improperly or dishonestly. 
12.115 A more significant implication of the policy-balancing approach 
as endorsed by Chua JC is that it may enlarge the range of permissible 
funding agreements. For while previously the doctrine of maintenance 
and champerty operated to void all funding agreements unless they fall 
within the limited proprietary or legitimate interest exceptions, the new 
approach may justify such agreements even in the absence of such 
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interests. This would be so if it is established that the agreement is 
struck on terms that would effectively increase the claimant’s access to 
justice without also threatening to sully the purity of justice. Whether or 
not Vanguard Energy has indeed paved the way for such development 
remains to be seen. It is worth noting that the Court of Appeal’s 
policy-focused analysis in the earlier decision of Lim Lie Hoa v  
Ong Jane Rebecca [1997] 1 SLR(R) 775 would lend some oblique support 
for such a development. 
12.116 Another category of contracts that may be rendered illegal and 
unenforceable for offending public policy is those seeking to oust the 
court’s jurisdiction. However, an attempt to avoid a contractual restraint 
on this ground failed in CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd v Asplenium 
Land Pte Ltd [2015] 3 SLR 1041 (“CKR”). Here, the Court of Appeal 
held that a contractual provision excluding a contractor’s right to 
restrain a beneficiary from calling on a performance bond on the 
ground of unconscionability was not an ouster clause and could not 
therefore be invalidated on this ground. The significance of this decision 
for banking practice in Singapore has already been incisively  
discussed in last year’s review (see (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev 73 at 91–95, 
paras 5.36–5.43). What remains to be noted here is the court’s 
cautionary reminder that this category of illegality is of a narrow ambit 
so it would be a rare and exceptional case where the plea would succeed. 
For that reason, the court would also be slow to construe limitations on 
rights and remedies as ousters of the court’s jurisdictions. Such 
provisions are, in the court’s view, more appropriately analysed as 
exclusion or limitation clauses, which may attract scrutiny under UCTA. 
12.117 In deciding whether the no injunction clause was an exclusion 
rather than an ouster clause, the Court of Appeal drew a distinction 
between a clause that merely restricts or excludes a common law 
remedy, and one that denies access to the courts: CKR at [19]. 
A restriction on a claimant’s right to injunctive reliefs is of the former 
characterisation because it did not in fact deny his access to the court. 
This analysis may suggest that an exclusion of a secondary (ie, remedial) 
right will rarely, if ever, constitute an ouster clause. In reality, however, 
this distinction between primary and secondary rights may not always 
be obvious or helpful. If a contractor had also agreed not to seek 
injunction on the ground of fraud, would such a restriction still qualify 
as an (relatively benign) exclusion clause? Ultimately, it would seem that 
a value judgment of the right given up by the constrained party cannot 
be avoided. In CKR, the Court of Appeal was clearly influenced (at [31]) 
by the fact that performance bonds are often intended to be “good as 
cash”. This factor militates against a construction that would shackle the 
holder’s right to call on the bond. However, a different result may be 
obtained in a case where the remedy constrained relates to a more 
fundamental right or interest, such as damages for injury to bodily 
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integrity. It is also conceivable that clever drafting can dress an ouster as 
an exclusion clause, the effects of which is no different from a denial of 
access to the courts. 
12.118 The case of Lim Beng Cheng (above, para 12.1) has already been 
considered in connection with the formation of contracts 
(see paras 12.1–12.5 above). Illegality was also raised in this case as the 
defendant had argued that the agreement in question – which originated 
from a sale and buy-back of an option granted over a property 
(“the April 2008 Option”) – was in fact a disguised loan amounting to an 
illegal moneylending contract under the Moneylenders Act (Cap 188, 
2010 Rev Ed) (“MLA”). This would suggest that the transactions 
between the parties were in truth a sham, so that what appeared as a sale 
and purchase was in fact a loan. Judith Prakash J categorically rejected 
this argument. Her Honour approached the issue by first considering 
whether the agreement (or more accurately, the transactions 
culminating in the agreement) was even a loan to begin with, for 
obviously there can be no moneylending without lending. For this 
purpose, Prakash J identified the applicable principles to be: 
(a) The proper approach in determining the true nature of 
the transaction is to look at the substance, as opposed to the 
form (Lim Beng Cheng at [64], citing E C Investment 
Holding Pte Ltd v Ridout Residence Pte Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 32 
(“E C Investment”) at [61]). 
(b) This may require the court to go beyond the documents 
and examine the parties’ position and relationship in the context 
of the entire factual matrix (Lim Beng Cheng at [66], citing City 
Hardware Pte Ltd v Kenrich Electronics Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR(R) 
733 at [24]). 
(c) However, the transaction generally reflects its substance 
so “there is a very strong presumption that parties intend to be 
bound by the provisions of agreements which they enter into” 
(Lim Beng Cheng at [65], citing Chng Bee Kheng v Chng Eng 
Chye [2013] 2 SLR 715 at [51]). 
(d) For that reason, the court would not normally look past 
the form unless there is cogent evidence to suggest the 
transaction was a sham (Lim Beng Cheng at [65], citing 
Sheagar s/o TM Veloo v Belfield International (Hong Kong) Ltd 
[2014] 3 SLR 524 (“Sheagar”) at [81]). 
12.119 Applying these principles, Prakash J found that the agreement 
in question was not tainted by illegality because the April 2008 Option 
was not a disguised loan but a genuine sale and buyback. Constraint of 
space does not permit a detailed account of the learned judge’s 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
(2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev Contract Law 349 
 
reasoning, but what may be usefully noted are those features held not to 
constitute sufficient evidence of a sham. These include: 
(a) the fact that the market price exceeded the purchase 
price; 
(b) the unusually high option price; and 
(c) the fact that the option holder was guaranteed a gain. 
Significantly, Prakash J also drew support for her conclusion from an 
examination of the surrounding circumstances including the parties’ 
post-contractual conduct. For example, the fact that the parties had 
subsequently negotiated for the plaintiff to waive his rights under the 
option, and entered into an agreement to that effect, was good evidence 
that they had always regarded the April 2008 Option to be genuine. At 
first blush, this reliance on post-contractual conduct may appear to 
conflict with the general principle that contracts are to be construed at 
the time when they were made and not thereafter (though this principle 
is by no means completely settled: see discussion in paras 12.35–12.38 
above). However, Prakash J’s approach is consistent with that adopted by 
the Court of Appeal in E C Investment. The reference to post-contractual 
evidence in this context may, exceptionally, be justified because where a 
sham is alleged, the most cogent evidence of the parties’ true intention is 
usually found outside the agreement. Hence, if an agreement is, on its 
face, structured as a sale, the only way to prove it is a loan would be to 
examine the circumstantial evidence, including the parties’ 
post-transaction conduct. (For a helpful analysis of the intricacies of 
re-characterisation, see Hans Tjio, “When is an Elephant a Bird?” (2006) 
18 SAcLJ 473.) 
12.120 The finding that no lending was involved effectively disposed of 
the arguments concerning MLA. However, Prakash J went on to 
consider the application of MLA in the interest of completeness. 
Although the plaintiff did not qualify as an excluded moneylender 
(since he had transacted in his personal capacity and not in the course 
of his business), the learned judge found he has not in any event 
contravened MLA since he was not, as a matter of fact, carrying on the 
business of a moneylender. This was because (applying the test laid 
down by Belinda Ang Saw Ean J in Mak Chik Lun v Loh Kim Her [2003] 
4 SLR(R) 338) there was no evidence of any system and continuity in the 
transactions, or that he was lending to all and sundry so long as he 
regarded them to be eligible. Quite the contrary, the plaintiff was 
engaged in a full-time business unrelated to moneylending, and the 
defendant was the only person with whom he had any financing 
relations. 
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12.121 Lim Beng Cheng adds to an important body of cases confirming 
our courts’ pragmatic approach to arguments founded on MLA. While 
they recognise the undisputed public interests in policing exploitative 
conduct of unlicensed moneylenders, they are also alert to the risk of 
the Act being utilised as a means to escape improvident bargains. As the 
Court of Appeal cautioned in Sheagar at [81], “[the] MLA must not be 
seen by desperate defendants as a ‘legal panacea’ to stave off their 
financial woes”. Thus, in a case such as Lim Beng Cheng, where the 
parties were seasoned businessmen with access to legal advice, it would 
be extremely arduous to convince the court to re-characterise the 
transactions so as to bring them within the remit of MLA. The 
presumption that form coincides with substance would in such an 
instance be especially difficult to displace. 
12.122 In the context of restraints of trade, it is well established that the 
unreasonable part(s) of the covenant may sometimes be severed by 
applying the “blue pencil test” so as to preserve the enforceability of the 
non-offending portion(s). It is, however, uncertain whether this 
doctrine applies only to restrictive covenants, or generally to all forms of 
illegality. In Choo Liang Haw v Chua Seet Mui [2015] 2 SLR 931, the 
High Court applied this doctrine to strike out certain clauses (the 
“Objectionable Clauses”) of a collective sale agreement that sought to 
impose penal obligations on subsidiary proprietors (“SPs”) who did not 
agree to a proposed collective sale. Although the court also 
cited s 84A(5A) of the Land Titles (Strata) Act (Cap 158, 2009 Rev Ed) 
(“LTSA”) as an alternative source of authority for striking down the 
Objectionable Clauses, the court clearly assumed that the blue pencil 
doctrine was of general application. 
12.123 In Lim Li Ming Dominic v Ching Png Sim Sally [2015] 5 SLR 989 
(“Lim Li Ming Dominic”), the Court of Appeal disagreed with the lower 
court as to the precise effects of the impugned clauses. In its view, these 
clauses, being objectively unfair and prejudicial to the non-consenting 
SPs, effectively tainted the transaction with bad faith. That being the 
case, the court was obliged to refuse the collective sale application. It has 
no discretion, whether under s 84A(5A) of LTSA or at common law, to 
“cure” the bad faith by purging or “blue-penciling” the offending 
clauses. In respect of the common law doctrine, the court noted it has 
traditionally been applied mainly in the sphere of restraint of trade, and 
uncertainty remains as to whether it could also be applied to other 
forms of illegality. Possibly, the doctrine only applies to those forms of 
unlawful conduct (eg, restraints of trade) that rank low on the scale of 
illegality. In any event, there was, in the court’s view, no possibility of 
applying the blue pencil test to the present context. This was presumably 
because the statutory context has clearly precluded such application. 
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12.124 Lim Li Ming Dominic thus leaves open the question as to the 
precise scope of the blue pencil doctrine. Nevertheless, the generally 
cautious tenor of the court’s observations, together with their previous 
hesitance in endorsing “notional severance”, would suggest that our 
courts would be slow to extend the doctrine to novel contexts. The 
desire to uphold bargains need always to be judiciously balanced against 
the risk of rewriting the terms of such bargains. 
Discharge by breach of contract 
Elective theory of discharge as applied to employment contracts 
12.125 In 2012, the UK Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Societe Generale v Geys [2013] 1 AC 523 (“Geys”) in which the majority 
clarified that, where an employment contract is breached by one of the 
parties thereto, discharge by reason of such breach arises at the election 
of the other party to that contract, just as it is in all other kinds of 
contract. Therefore, even an extremely serious breach does not bring the 
contract to an end automatically – it is always open to the other party to 
keep the contract on foot, at least in principle. 
12.126 In its decision in Schonk Antonius Martinus Mattheus v Enholco 
Pte Ltd [2015] SGCA 65 (“Schonk (CA)”), though it makes no reference 
to Geys, it would appear that the Court of Appeal has reached a similar 
conclusion. This case involved massive breaches of the duties of fidelity 
and loyalty owed by an employee (“Mattheus”) to his employer (“EPL”). 
12.127 In this case, it was established at first instance that Mattheus 
had, whilst employed by EPL, diverted business opportunities away 
from EPL to a company he had set up himself and which he controlled: 
see Enholco Pte Ltd v Schonk, Antonius Martinus Mattheus [2015] 
SGHC 20. At first instance, however, the trial judge had disallowed a 
counterclaim by Mattheus in respect of unpaid salary totalling $60,000. 
The trial judge had also awarded a conventional sum of $50,000 in 
respect of EPL’s claim for damages for loss of future profits it would have 
earned, but for Mattheus’s diversionary activities: see [2015] SGHC 108. 
Both Mattheus and EPL appealed against the trial judge’s decisions on 
these points. 
12.128 On appeal, the Court of Appeal held (at [24]–[26]) that the trial 
judge need not have limited EPL’s claim for loss of future profits to a 
conventional figure of $50,000. 
12.129 More interestingly in the present context, however, the Court of 
Appeal also allowed Mattheus’s appeal against the decision in the court 
below not to allow his counterclaim for unpaid salary. Thus (at [15]): 
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In our judgment, an employer may claim damages for any breach of 
duty by its employee but such a breach will not by itself disentitle the 
employee to his or her salary. Rather, the employer may make a 
deduction from the salary in respect of such loss as it proves it has 
suffered by reason of the employee’s breach (Sagar v H Ridehalgh 
and Son, Limited [1931] 1 Ch 310 at 325). 
12.130 The Court of Appeal upheld (at [8]) the finding in the court 
below that Mattheus remained employed by EPL until 24 August 2012 
when his employment was “terminated”; although the precise basis for 
this termination, eg, whether it was pursuant to a contractual provision 
allowing for unilateral termination of employment by the employer with 
notice or for cause, was not made clear in any of the grounds of decision 
either at first instance or on appeal. 
12.131 The Court of Appeal appears, however, to have accepted 
(at [16]) Mattheus’s contention that such action by EPL amounted to a 
repudiatory breach on its part. Further, the Court of Appeal found 
(at [16]) that Mattheus had accepted this repudiatory breach on the part 
of EPL from June 2012 onwards, which was when, “he, by his own 
admission, state[d] that he ceased to regard himself as an employee 
[of EPL]”. 
12.132 While the details as to whether and how such acceptance of 
repudiation had been communicated to EPL are not clearly explained in 
the report (perhaps owing to the grounds of decision having been 
handed down ex tempore by the Chief Justice), what seems relatively 
clear is that this decision cannot be consistent with the view that, 
exceptionally, an employer’s repudiatory breach of an employment 
contract automatically discharges it (as Lord Sumption, the dissentient 
in Geys (above, para 12.125), sought to argue). Rather, the Court of 
Appeal’s decision is more consistent with the majority position in Geys. 
Accordingly, though some doubts may remain on the facts of this case as 
to questions of communication of the employee’s election to accept a 
repudiatory breach (leading to its discharge) or to reject it (therefore 
keeping it on foot), Schonk (CA) (above, para 12.126) may stand for the 
proposition that employment contracts are to be treated no differently 
from others in so far as discharge for repudiatory breach remains a 
matter of election on the part of the party on the receiving end of the 
repudiation. 
Anticipatory repudiatory breach where the party not in breach has no 
outstanding duties to perform under the terms of the contract 
12.133 In The STX Mumbai [2014] 3 SLR 1116, the High Court 
questioned whether a contracting party who has no outstanding duties 
to perform under that contract may discharge that contract by reason of 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
(2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev Contract Law 353 
 
an anticipatory repudiatory breach by the counter-party. Judgment in 
the appeal from that decision has now been handed down: The STX 
Mumbai [2015] 5 SLR 1 (“STX Mumbai (CA)”). 
12.134 The doubts raised by the High Court were discussed at length in 
last year’s review, (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev 217 at 257–260,  
paras 12.117–12.130, and the facts of the case were set out at  
paras 12.115–12.116, so it is not necessary to go over them here. 
12.135 The Court of Appeal rationalised the doctrine of anticipatory 
repudiatory breach as being, in essence, an actual breach: “[i]f it is the 
case that the defendant has evinced a clear intention that it will not 
perform its obligations under the contract, then we see little reason why 
this very fact might not itself form the basis for holding that, in principle 
and logic, an actual breach has, in substance, occurred – 
notwithstanding that the time for the defendant’s performance has yet to 
arrive under the contract.” Consequently, “it would not matter whether 
the contract was executed or executory” [emphasis in original omitted]: 
STX Mumbai (CA) at [51] 
12.136 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Court of 
Appeal has largely rejected the concerns raised in the High Court and 
has concluded that the doctrine of anticipatory repudiatory breach may 
be relied on by a party who has no outstanding duties to perform under 
that contract. Consequently, the Court of Appeal has confirmed that 
“the doctrine of anticipatory breach applies to both executed and 
executory contracts” and, for the avoidance of doubt, the Court of 
Appeal also stated (at [63]) that in principle, the doctrine also applies to 
unilateral contracts, as well. 
12.137 In so doing, the Court of Appeal cited with approval the analysis 
in Qiao Liu, Anticipatory Breach (Hart Publishing, 2011) on the 
applicability of the anticipatory breach doctrine to both executed and 
executory contracts, as well as that in John W Carter, “The Breach of 
Unilateral Contracts” (1982) 11 Anglo-American L Rev 169, as to the 
applicability of the anticipatory breach doctrine to unilateral contracts. 
12.138 Whilst recognising that it was possible to view an anticipatory 
breach as amounting to a breach of an implied term in law that the 
parties are not to act in such a way as would render the other’s 
performance of its obligations towards completion of the contract an 
exercise in futility (at [45]), the Court of Appeal (at [48]) was concerned 
that this approach could be criticised as being somewhat artificial. If so, 
by way of alternative, the Court of Appeal reasoned (at [51]) as follows: 
If it is the case that the defendant has evinced a clear intention that it 
will not perform its obligations under the contract, then we see little 
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reason why this very fact might not itself form the basis for holding 
that, in principle and logic, an actual breach has, in substance, 
occurred – notwithstanding the fact that the time for the defendant’s 
performance has yet to arrive under the contract. The defendant is 
not prejudiced simply because its conduct clearly signals that it would 
not be performing its obligations under the contract. … If … there is 
… no prejudice involved, then there is … nothing preventing the court 
(in both principle and logic) from utilising the defendant’s conduct as 
itself evincing a present (ie, actual) breach of its obligations under the 
contract – albeit notified in advance to the plaintiff. This seems to us 
to be a much less convoluted way of understanding the basis 
underlying the doctrine of anticipatory breach, whilst simultaneously 
avoiding the artificiality surrounding the use of the device of the 
implied promise. [emphasis in original] 
12.139 The above analysis appears to provide a short-cut to avoid the 
need to resort to the imposition of an appropriate implied term to 
rationalise how “anticipatory breaches” operate. Though presented as a 
simpler and less artificial way of rationalising the outcome in a case 
where a party who has no outstanding obligations under a contract 
seeks to prematurely determine the contract on account of the 
counter-party’s repudiation of its outstanding contractual obligations by 
recasting the counter-party’s repudiation as an actual, present breach by 
reason of that repudiation in and of itself, a puzzle remains: in such 
circumstances, what has the counter-party presently breached by such 
repudiation? 
12.140 If A has promised B that he will start painting B’s house in a 
fortnight’s time, and complete the work one week thereafter, when A 
informs B in no uncertain terms the following day that under no 
circumstance will he start painting B’s house as had been promised, 
what has A breached at the time of the repudiation? The act of 
commencing work still lies in the future, as does the act of completing 
works – so there cannot be any non-performance of those acts whose 
performance is only due sometime in the future. Yet the Court of Appeal 
assures us that the present repudiation amounts to a present breach – 
but what of? It seems that what is breached is the promise to so act in the 
future, and that is enough to generate liability for breach of contract. 
12.141 The point of a promise is that the promisor undertakes to 
ensure that that which it has promised will come about, that the 
promised state of affairs will ensue. Almost invariably, in order for that 
state of affairs to ensue, it will be necessary that the promisor act, and 
refrain from acting, in certain ways in the interim. For example, the 
promisor must not act in such a way in the meantime as would prevent 
that promised state of affairs from arising – for to do so would be to act 
in a way that would lead to a breach of its promise. On a more 
traditional analysis, it follows that every express promissory term in a 
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contract logically entails within it an implicit promise that the promisor 
will not act in such a way in the meantime as would prevent that 
promised state of affairs from arising. 
12.142 Thus, precisely as was held in Hochster v De La Tour (1853) 
2 El & Bl 678 at 689; 118 ER 922 at 926, the genesis of the doctrine of 
anticipatory breach: 
[W]here there is a contract to do an act on a future day, there is a 
relation constituted between the parties in the meantime by the 
contract, and that they impliedly promise that in the meantime neither 
will do anything to the prejudice of the other inconsistent with that 
relation … [F]rom the day of hiring till the day when the employment 
was to being, [the plaintiff and defendant] were engaged to each other; 
and it seems to be a breach of an implied contract if either of them 
renounces the engagement. 
12.143 It may be, therefore, that the two alternative grounds set out by 
the Court of Appeal for its decision are, perhaps, merely two different 
ways of saying precisely the same thing. In any event, it is clear that the 
end-results of the two approaches, the traditional “implied term” 
approach and the alternative “breach of promise” approach proposed by 
the Court of Appeal lead to the same conclusion: an anticipatory breach 
is an actual, present breach. 
12.144 Notwithstanding the above, the Court of Appeal ultimately 
concluded that the court below ought not to have struck out the 
appellant’s action for repudiatory breach by the respondent by reason of 
the insolvency of a company related to it. The Court of Appeal agreed 
with the court below that, in principle, the onset of insolvency in and of 
itself could not amount to an anticipatory breach. However, the onset of 
insolvency within certain factual contexts could lead to situations where 
a contractual promisor would be disabled from performing its part of 
the contractual bargain. Therefore, it was not completely unarguable 
that the insolvency of a company related to the respondent would lead 
to its being unable to make timely payments under its bunker contracts 
with the appellant. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal (at [79]–[89]) 
reversed the decision in the court below to strike out the appellant’s 
claim based on anticipatory breach as being legally unsustainable. 
Remedies 
Basis for assessing damages for breach of contract for sale of goods 
12.145 In Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 686 
(“Gimpex v Unity”), the Court of Appeal had to consider what the 
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appropriate basis for assessing damages for losses arising from breach of 
warranty in a sale of goods contract should be. 
12.146 In this case, the respondent (“Gimpex”) had contracted to 
purchase 41,150 metric tonnes of high quality coal from the first 
appellant (“Unity”) for delivery in Karachi at a contract price of US$66 
per metric tonne (“the Contract Price”). In May 2012, Gimpex rejected 
the coal on delivery, contending that it was of much lower quality than 
that contractually specified, and then launched legal proceedings 
against Unity for, inter alia, breach of contract. 
12.147 At first instance, the trial judge held that Gimpex had 
established that the coal supplied by Unity was of much lower quality 
than that specified in the contract of sale, and ordered damages for such 
breach of warranty by Unity to be assessed by the Registrar. 
12.148 On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding below as 
to Unity’s breach of warranty. It then proceeded to assess the damages 
payable to Gimpex as both parties had adduced evidence and made 
submissions on this issue in the court below, instead of remitting it to 
the Registrar: Gimpex v Unity at [194]. 
12.149 The complication in this case was that in reliance on its contract 
with Unity, Gimpex had contracted to sell 41,150 metric tonnes of coal 
of the same quality as it had contracted to purchase from Unity to a 
subsidiary corporation controlled by a third party (“Awan”) at a price of 
US$68 per metric tonne. This was less than the market price of the 
contracted-for quality of coal upon its delivery in May 2012 (which the 
Court of Appeal held was US$83 per metric tonne): Gimpex v Unity 
at [221]. 
12.150 Relying on s 51(3) of the Sale of Goods Act (Cap 393, 
1999 Rev Ed) (“SOGA”), Gimpex submitted that its damages should be 
quantified by reference to the difference between the market price of the 
contracted-for quality of coal and the Contract Price. 
12.151 However, relying on the fact that Gimpex had failed to perform 
its obligations to Awan’s subsidiary and so, had not been able to earn the 
US$68 per metric tonne that would have been payable under that 
contract, and also on the fact that no legal proceedings had been 
brought against Gimpex in respect of its breach of that contract, Unity 
contended that damages ought to be awarded simply by reference to 
Gimpex’s loss arising from its inability to fulfill that contract, coupled 
with an indemnity should legal proceedings be brought against Gimpex 
in respect of that breach. 
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12.152 The Court of Appeal rejected Unity’s submission and followed 
the position set out in the House of Lords decision in 
Williams Brothers v Ed T Agius, Limited [1914] AC 510. In particular, 
reliance was placed on Lord Dunedin’s speech (at pp 522–523): 
[W]hen there is no delivery of the goods the position is quite a 
different one. The buyer never gets them, and he is entitled to be put 
in the position in which he would have stood if he had got them at the 
due date. That position is the position of a man who has goods at the 
market price of the day — and barring special circumstances, the 
defaulting seller is neither mulct in damages for the extra profit which 
the buyer would have got owing to a forward resale at over the market 
price (Great Western Ry Co v Redmayne), nor can he take benefit of the 
fact that the buyer has made a forward resale at under the market price. 
[emphasis added] 
12.153 The Court of Appeal noted that matters could be different, had 
Gimpex and Unity understood at the time of contracting that Gimpex 
had bought the coal specifically to fulfill its contractual commitment to 
Awan’s subsidiary to provide coal of the same quantity and quality, and 
if the contract between them had provided for sub-sales down the line. 
But on the facts, the contract between Gimpex and Unity made no 
reference to sub-sales, and Unity only came to know of the terms of the 
contract between Gimpex and Awan’s subsidiary some time afterwards. 
So there was no basis for Unity’s contention: Gimpex v Unity at [216]. 
12.154 Absent such circumstances, the prima facie position set out 
in s 51(3) of SOGA prevailed. In short (at [215]): 
Gimpex should be put in the position as if the defendants did not 
breach the Contract. That means that Gimpex should have obtained 
the coal of the quality specified in the Contract, and if there is an 
increase in the market value of the coal from the time of contracting 
and the time of delivery, then Gimpex must be compensated on the 
basis of the coal having a higher value. As it is undisputed that there is 
a market for the coal at the time of the breach, it should be clear that 
the measure of damages should be the difference between the 
Contract price and the market price of the coal at the time the coal 
ought to have been delivered. 
12.155 This being the case, it was unnecessary for the Court to address 
the question as to whether an indemnity might be ordered in respect of 
such liability as Awan or Awan’s subsidiary might bring against Gimpex. 
The propriety of such orders of indemnity was, however, examined by 
the Court of Appeal in Freight Connect (S) Pte Ltd v Paragon Shipping 
Pte Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 178 (“Freight v Paragon”). 
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Orders of indemnity for potential liability to third parties arising out 
of the defendant’s breach of contract 
12.156 In Freight v Paragon, the appellant (“Freight Connect”) had 
contracted the respondent (“Paragon Shipping”) to provide a vessel to 
ship cargo from Nanwei to Singapore. Ultimately, it was agreed that the 
“AAL Dampier” would be supplied for this purpose. 
12.157 In reliance on this, the respondent entered into an agreement 
with FLS Thailand Co, Ltd (“FLS”) to charter the AAL Dampier (whose 
vessel it was) on terms similar to those agreed between the respondent 
and the appellant save for the freight and amounts payable per day 
pro rata for detention, the respondent’s margin on these two 
back-to-back charterparties being US$6,000 on the freight and 
US$5,000 per day pro rata for detention. 
12.158 Due to the appellant’s failure to provide certain shipping and 
customs documents to the port authorities, the AAL Dampier lost its 
berth booking at Nanwei Port and the intended cargo could not be 
loaded on her: that cargo was ultimately loaded on another vessel. The 
respondent then brought legal proceedings against the appellant 
claiming damages in the sum of US$236,000 comprising US$161,000 for 
freight and US$75,000 for detention. The respondent also sought an 
order for the appellant to indemnify it against any liability it might face 
vis-à-vis FLS. 
12.159 At first instance, the trial judge awarded the respondent 
US$6,000 being the net profit it would have earned on the back-to-back 
charterparties, and US$75,000 in detention charges. The learned judge 
also granted the order of indemnity sought by the respondent: see 
Paragon Shipping Pte Ltd v Freight Connect Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 574. 
The appellant then appealed against the whole of the trial judge’s 
decision. 
12.160 On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge’s decision on the 
quantum of damages to be paid by the appellant to the respondent for 
loss of profit (at [36]) and in respect of the detention charges  
(at [37]–[44]). However, it held that on these facts, it was inappropriate 
for the trial judge to have made the order of indemnity given that there 
was nothing to indicate that any claim might or would be made by FLS 
against the respondent as at the time of trial. 
12.161 The Court of Appeal noted (at [53]) that the issue as to whether 
an indemnity might be ordered on facts such as these had been decided 
by the Federal Court decision of Eastern Oceanic Corp Ltd v  
Orchard Furnishing House Building Co [1965–1967] SLR(R) 25 
(“Eastern Oceanic”), being an appeal to the Federal Court from 
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Singapore. In that case, the Federal Court examined the English position 
as set out in Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd [1952] 
2 QB 297 (“Trans Trust”) where the English Court of Appeal 
disapproved of the decision of Lewis J in Household Machines Limited v 
Cosmos Exporters Limited [1947] KB 217 (“Household Machines”). 
Ultimately, the Federal Court agreed with the English Court of Appeal, 
stating (at [18]): 
In that case [ie, Trans Trust], Somervell LJ and Denning LJ 
disapproved a declaration of indemnity in respect of a possible claim 
by a third party who had not at that juncture made a claim. 
Somervell LJ pointed out that, when the stage was reached when a 
precise claim could be made by the plaintiff against the defendant, 
difficult questions might arise depending on differences in the contracts 
between plaintiff and defendant as compared with those made between 
the plaintiff and the third party (a relevant consideration in the present 
case) and on such questions as the obligation of the third party to 
mitigate damages. Logic is on the side of the views expressed by 
Somervell LJ and Denning LJ that the issue should be reserved with 
liberty to apply for directions when the real issues can be determined and 
damages quantified. The order of the High Court should therefore 
stand. Presumably, the situation in regard to claims by third parties 
should soon be clarified once the work to be completed by the 
appellant has been done. [emphasis added] 
12.162 The Federal Court explained (at [17]) that the outcome in 
Household Machines (in which an indemnity was ordered by Lewis J) 
could be rationalised because “the third party [in Household Machines] 
had already made a claim, but the amount was liable to be increased 
because of possible claims on the third party by subpurchasers”. In cases 
where no claims had yet to be made, in light of the difficulties identified 
by Somervell and Denning LJJ in Trans Trust, the more appropriate 
order would be to reserve the damages that the claimant might have to 
pay third parties. 
12.163 The Court of Appeal recognised that since the principle in 
Eastern Oceanic had stood for many years (and the principle in 
Trans Trust had stood for even longer as a matter of English law), it 
would not reverse that position. Accordingly, it held that the trial judge 
had erred in granting the order of indemnity since, on the facts as were 
before the court, FLS had yet to make any claim against the respondent. 
Indeed, the Court of Appeal observed (at [55]) that it might not even 
have been appropriate to reserve the question of damages (as had been 
suggested by the Federal Court in Household Machines) noting: 
In the present case, we do not think that a reservation is necessary. It is 
not necessary for any action by FLS to be heard before the Judge. No 
claim has been made. If and when FLS brings an action against the 
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Respondent, it will no doubt join the Appellant as a third party to the 
proceedings. 
What is lost when a contract is breached? 
12.164 The difficult case of ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2015] 
2 SLR 218 involving a breach of a contract to provide in-vitro 
fertilisation services was heard by the High Court in the early part of 
2015. Part of the dispute related to a breach of contract by the third 
defendant, the plaintiff ’s embryologist, who had contracted to fertilise 
the plaintiff ’s egg with her husband’s sperm. The breach arose when, due 
to a mix-up, the third defendant fertilised the plaintiff ’s egg with the 
sperm of an unrelated stranger. The mistakenly fertilised egg was 
carried to term by the plaintiff who gave birth to a healthy child 
(“Baby P”) some time later. The error was only realised afterwards when 
tests were conducted to understand why Baby P’s skin tone and hair 
colour were different from that of the plaintiff, her husband, and their 
other child (who had also been conceived using a similar in-vitro 
fertilisation procedure). 
12.165 It was clear that the third defendant had committed a breach of 
her contractual obligations to the plaintiff. The primary issue before the 
court, however, was whether, as a matter of public policy, damages 
quantified by reference to the cost of reasonable upkeep of Baby P ought 
to be permitted. The High Court concluded not. 
12.166 The appeal from the decision of the High Court was heard by 
the Court of Appeal in August 2015, but judgment has yet to be handed 
down. In its absence, any analysis of the complex questions of public 
policy and private law doctrine would certainly be premature. 
Accordingly, comment on this matter will be reserved until the Court of 
Appeal hands down its judgment. 
Contracts involving conveyance of interests in land and the remedy of 
specific performance 
12.167 In E C Investment (above, para 12.118), following Canadian and 
New Zealand authority, Quentin Loh J questioned whether damages 
were invariably inadequate as a remedy for breaches of contractual 
obligations to convey an interest in land. In that case, Loh J concluded 
that that was not so, and that on the facts of that case, damages were an 
adequate remedy even though the contract breached was a contract for 
the sale of land. Consequently, Loh J held that it was not appropriate to 
grant the remedy of specific performance (at [109]) and awarded 
damages, instead. 
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12.168 When the matter went on appeal, the Court of Appeal left the 
question open, holding that it was not necessary to decide the matter on 
this point: E C Investment at [103]. 
12.169 The issue has resurfaced in the case of Lim Beng Cheng (above, 
para 12.1), some aspects of which were discussed above in connection 
with the formation of contracts (see paras 12.1–12.5) and also illegality 
(see paras 12.118–12.121). As mentioned above, the case concerned an 
agreement under which the defendant promised to transfer a 46.5% 
stake in a property to the plaintiff. To be specific, in consideration for 
the forgiveness of a debt of $279,352 owing due to the plaintiff by the 
defendant, the defendant would pay the plaintiff a cash amount of 
$79,352, and the balance of $200,000 would be “converted into [a] 46.5% 
share of the property at Blk 803 King George’s Ave #02-160”:  
Lim Beng Cheng at [46]. 
12.170 As mentioned above (at para 12.1), Judith Prakash J rejected the 
defendant’s contention that this agreement was just a proposal: it was a 
binding contract as the plaintiff had furnished good consideration in 
exchange for the defendant’s promise to cause the plaintiff to be vested 
with a share in the legal title of the King George Avenue property. 
Accordingly, the defendant breached the contract when he failed to give 
effect to his promise. The question therefore arose as to whether an 
order of specific performance ought to be issued to compel him to 
perform his promise, or whether damages might be the more 
appropriate remedy. 
12.171 After noting the positions that had previously been adopted in 
cases like E C Investment by Loh J and the other Singaporean, Canadian 
and New Zealand authorities that had been referred to in that decision, 
Prakash J noted (at [104]) that the Court of Appeal had left the question 
open, and then set out the following view: 
Post-E C Investment, the status of the more restrictive approach in 
Canada and New Zealand in Singapore is not entirely clear. The Court 
of Appeal certainly did not rule out the possibility that Singapore law 
may follow the jurisprudence of Canada and New Zealand and it was 
careful not to express a positive view either way on the preference 
shown by Chan J, Lee JC and Loh J for the Canadian and New Zealand 
approach. From academic analysis of Canadian decisions (see Robert J 
Sharpe, Injunctions and Specific Performance (Canada Law Book, 
Looseleaf Ed, November 2014 release)), it appears that the Canadian 
authorities view uniqueness as a matter of degree. Even where the 
purchaser’s interest is purely commercial, an inquiry is undertaken as 
to whether the uniqueness of a property makes an assessment of its 
income-producing qualities difficult. In my view, in modern 
conditions of huge high-rise developments accompanied by a 
substantial market for the acquisition of investment property, this is a 
more sensible and nuanced approach than the unquestioning 
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assumption underlying the traditional English and Australian 
approach that land is unique such that damages will almost invariably 
be an inadequate remedy. 
12.172 On the facts, Prakash J noted (at [107]) that the plaintiff himself 
had acknowledged that his interest in the unit was, “primarily monetary 
in the form of an investment and from that perspective damages should 
be an adequate remedy” and that “[a]ltogether the plaintiff agree[d] that 
in the circumstances of this case damages in lieu of specific performance 
may be the more equitable and practical remedy”. The learned judge also 
noted that there would be prejudice to third parties if an order of 
specific performance were ordered (since a third party, one NC Tan, also 
held a small percentage interest in the legal title to the subject property). 
And so (at [112]): 
Ordering specific performance would, therefore, force three hostile 
parties to work together and this would likely end up in stalemate and 
further resort to the court to solve disagreements amongst them. This 
is therefore another important factor in favour of [sic] granting 
specific performance. 
(From the context, it would appear that the phrase “in favour of ” may 
have been erroneously inserted instead of the word “against”). 
12.173 Ultimately, Prakash J decided (at [119]) that specific 
performance ought not to be ordered: 
On the basis that damages are an adequate remedy and that an order 
of specific performance would lead to a stalemate between three 
hostile parties, I order damages in lieu of specific performance. 
Consequently, Prakash J awarded (at [127]) the plaintiff “damages in 
lieu of specific performance”, and held that such damages were to be 
assessed “as at the date of judgment” (at [124]) and not the date of 
breach (for reasons outlined at [120]–[124]). 
12.174 It is significant that Prakash J’s order was for damages in lieu of 
specific performance, and not damages at common law. 
Notwithstanding Prakash J’s recognition that damages at common law 
might well be an adequate remedy, and so would preclude access to the 
court’s concurrent equitable jurisdiction over contract, Prakash J’s order 
tells us that she must have been of the opinion that the court’s equitable 
jurisdiction had been engaged, even so. Had the court’s equitable 
jurisdiction not been engaged at all, no damages in lieu of specific 
performance could have been ordered pursuant to s 18(2), read with the 
First Sched, para 14, Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 
2007 Rev Ed). 
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12.175 As explained in The Law of Contract in Singapore 
(Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) 
at para 23.175: 
[I]n England, courts of equity have long been statutorily empowered 
to award damages in lieu of or in addition to a decree for specific 
performance or injunction, in cases where the dispute would have 
fallen within the equitable jurisdiction of the court, but where the 
remedy was refused on discretionary grounds. [emphasis in original] 
12.176 The statutory power of a Singapore court to make a similar 
order appears to be derived from the same basis. If so, by ordering 
damages in lieu of specific performance, the learned judge must have 
concluded that the court’s equitable jurisdiction had been engaged, 
notwithstanding contract damages being a perfectly adequate remedy. 
The question, therefore, is where such jurisdiction might be founded? 
12.177 In this connection, it may be apposite to highlight certain 
distinctions within the law which were not brought to the learned 
judge’s attention by counsel. For one, it may be helpful to consider more 
carefully what kind of “specific performance” a purchaser of an interest 
in land may be seeking. 
12.178 Denis Browne, the editor of Ashburner’s Principles of Equity 
(Butterworths, 2nd Ed, 1933) (“Ashburner”), noted that the principle 
that equity regards that as done which ought to be done as applied to 
contracts entails not one, but two conceptions of specific performance: a 
“strict” or “narrow” sense, and another, “broader” usage. 
12.179 The distinction is explained in Ashburner (at p 258) as follows: 
If A agrees to sell land to B, either of the parties can come into a court 
of equity for a specific performance [in the narrow sense] of the 
contract; and the court specifically performs it, either by ordering A, 
to convey the land on payment of the purchase-money, or by 
ordering B to pay the purchase-money on having the conveyance of 
the land. If B in the case supposed has paid the purchase price, he 
acquires by payment a proprietary right over the land, the 
subject-matter of the contract; and he can enforce his proprietary right 
by any equitable remedy which his case may require, such as the sale 
of the land under the order of the court, the appointment of a receiver 
of the rents and profits, or the grant of an injunction to restrain A from 
interfering with his enjoyment. Such relief may be called specific, in the 
sense that it applies to a specific subject-matter, but it is totally 
unconnected with the relief given in an action for specific 
performance in the strict sense. The court is not prevented where the 
consideration is executed, from giving equitable relief, by the fact that 
specific performance in the strict sense, is impossible. [emphasis 
added] 
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12.180 Ashburner finds authority for the proposition that a court may 
issue an injunction to restrain a vendor from “interfering with the 
enjoyment” of the purchaser once the purchase price had been paid so as 
to vindicate the purchaser’s equitable proprietary interest in the 
subject-matter of the contract of sale in a trio of cases, namely 
Frederick v Frederick (1721) 1 P Wms 710, 24 ER 582 (Ch);  
(1731) 1 Bro 253, 1 ER 549 (HL); Coventry v Coventry (1724) 
2 P Wms 222, 24 ER 707 (arguments) (Ch); 1 Stra 596, 93 ER 722 
(judgments) (Ch) and Simultaneous Colour Printing Syndicate v 
Foweraker (1901) 1 QB 771. He also makes reference to the Appendix to 
Richard Francis, Maxims of Equity (London: Henry Lintot, 3rd Ed, 
1746). 
12.181 Presumably, the reference is to the report of the arguments of 
Lord Cottenham LC, Sir Joseph Jekyll MR, Sir Robert Price and 
Sir Jefery Gilbert, both Barons of the Exchequer, concerning the 
defective execution of powers in The Earl of Coventry’s Case (1667) 
1 Eq Ca Abr 349, 21 ER 1094; (1721) Gilb Rep 160, 25 ER 112 (Ch); 
(1721) 10 Mod 463, 88 ER 811 (Ch); (1722) 9 Mod 12, 88 ER 284 (Ch) 
which are reproduced towards the end of the book. 
12.182 The problem before the court in The Earl of Coventry’s Case was 
as follows: the late Earl of Coventry had, on the occasion of his marriage 
to Anne, the daughter of Sir Strensham Masters, covenanted with 
Sir Strensham and with Anne that, in consideration of intended 
marriage and of £10,000 (which was actually paid by Sir Strensham) as 
Anne’s marriage-portion, that he would settle a legal estate on Anne, 
sufficient to generate an annual income of £500, possession to 
commence immediately after his death, if she survived him. The 
particular parcel of land as would be settled for the purpose was not 
ascertained until some time after the marriage, but due to a series of 
accidents, the Earl did not manage to settle that parcel on trusts for the 
benefit of Anne before his death. The issue, therefore, was whether 
Anne, his widow, had an equitable interest in the said lands as would 
justify the grant of an equitable remedy to compel the Earl’s heir and 
successor-in-title to convey the legal title in that parcel of land to her (so 
as to allow her to have possession of the same) in accordance with the 
covenant in the marriage settlement, or if she should be restricted to a 
remedy at law for breach of the covenant. 
12.183 The court concluded that the facts were such that an equitable 
remedy should issue. (The facts of the case are probably best 
summarised in the report in (1721) 10 Mod 463, 88 ER 811 (Ch), 
although reference to the reports in (1721) Gilb Rep 160, 
25 ER 112 (Ch) and (1722) 9 Mod 12, 88 ER 284 (Ch) are useful as they 
make it plain that the parcel of land in question was held by the Earl of 
Coventry in fee, and not in fee tail: if the estate in question was entailed, 
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the dispute would have been moot as it would not have been possible for 
the Earl to deal with that estate without first breaking the entail, and the 
procedure to do so does not appear to have been applied on the reported 
facts of the case). 
12.184 The reasoning of the court, however, is difficult to divine from 
the nominate reports of The Earl of Coventry’s Case which have been 
listed above as they do not reproduce, in particular, the judgments of 
Baron Gilbert or Baron Price. These are only to be found in the 
appendix to Francis’s Maxims of Equity, and so, it is to that that 
Ashburner turns. 
12.185 The following extracts from Francis’s account of the case are of 
particular relevance in the present context. First, Baron Gilbert noted 
(at p 4) as follows: 
Where there is a price paid, and there comes a subsequent marriage, 
which are the consideration of marriage-articles, I look upon the 
jointress to be, eo instanti that the price is paid, and the articles 
executed, a purchaser for a valuable consideration. In all cases, where 
an agreement is entered into in contemplation of a valuable 
consideration, when that is performed, it is but justice and conscience, 
that the purchaser should have an immediate right and ownership, in 
what he hath so purchased: And therefore a court of equity, before the 
execution of any legal conveyance, looks upon the party to be in 
immediate possession of such estate, and to have a power of devising 
and giving it away[.] [emphasis in original] 
And Baron Price observed (at p 7): 
Now, if notwithstanding any defect in the non-observance of 
circumstances, the legal estate should not be conveyed in virtue of this 
power; yet as she paid a valuable consideration, for what was intended 
to be passed under this power; there is the same foundation for 
considering her as a cestuy que trust, as the other a trustee[.] 
12.186 For both Baron Gilbert and Baron Price, the reason for allowing 
the remedy in equity was because the Earl’s widow had furnished 
executed consideration in respect of the covenant by marrying the Earl 
(and in the eyes of equity, the marriage-consideration was good 
consideration). Consequently, having had the benefit of such marriage, 
it would have been unconscionable for the Earl not to perform that 
which he had covenanted to do. Thus, the equitable jurisdiction would 
be engaged, and an equitable remedy would have been available to his 
wife to compel him to perform that which he had covenanted to do 
during his lifetime, notwithstanding that she might have been able to 
obtain a remedy at law in damages by way as an alternative. And if that 
was the case vis-à-vis the Earl, then so too his heir: as a volunteer 
successor-in-title, the Earl’s heir could take no better interest that the 
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Earl himself would have done. Consequently, it would follow that the 
Earl’s widow was entitled to equitable relief against the Earl’s heir, 
notwithstanding the availability of a remedy at law for breach of 
covenant. 
12.187 For present purposes, it is also helpful to reproduce Ashburner’s 
summary of Frederick v Frederick which reads as follows: 
In Frederick v Frederick, A agreed with the Court of Aldermen in 
consideration of B marrying him, to take up his freedom of the city 
within one year. A died after the year without taking up his freedom. It 
was held, first by Lord Macclesfield, and then by the House of Lords, 
that A’s personal estate was distributable in favour of B and the issue of 
the marriage as if he had been a freeman at his death. 
Lord Macclesfield said: ‘Where one for valuable consideration agrees 
to do a thing, such executory contract is to be taken as done, and the 
man who made the agreement shall not be in a better case than if he 
had fairly and honestly performed what he agreed to’. 
12.188 Ashburner emphasises, however, that in Frederick v Frederick, 
A had married B: the executory consideration which he had given in 
exchange for the Court of Aldermen’s promise to grant him the status of 
a freeman had become executed by the time of his death. The point is 
most plainly explained (at para 3-235) by the editors of  
Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrine & Remedies 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th Ed, 2015): 
Ashburner demonstrated that even the proposition that the right to 
invoke the remedy [of treating that as done that which ought to be 
done] in contractual cases depends on the availability of specific 
performance is true only if ‘specific performance is understood to 
connote that remedy in either its primary or its secondary sense’: that 
is, as a remedy to enforce either a wholly executory or a partly 
executed contract. For example, the contract in Frederick v Frederick 
… was not specifically performable in the ‘primary sense’ of that term. 
The promisor could not be ordered to take up his freedom because by 
the time of the suit he was dead. Yet the maxim [that equity deems as 
done that which ought to be done] applied. 
12.189 As noted above, in Lim Beng Cheng (above, para 12.1), the 
learned judge ordered damages in lieu of specific performance. So far as 
this rests on the statutory power set out in the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) and so far as invocation of that 
power assumes that the dispute would have fallen within the court’s 
equitable jurisdiction but where the remedy had been refused merely on 
discretionary grounds, the making of such an order tells us that the 
court’s equitable jurisdiction to grant specific remedies must, somehow, 
have been triggered. 
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12.190 Given the old English cases discussed above, it would appear 
that such jurisdiction was engaged on the facts of Lim Beng Cheng 
(above, para 12.1) so far as the “price” for the partial interest in the land 
in question had been paid once the plaintiff released the defendant from 
the debt of $237,000, and so provided executed consideration under the 
contract, leading equity to regard the plaintiff as having an equitable 
interest in the legal title to the realty in question by operation of the 
maxim “equity deems as done that which ought to be done”. 
12.191 If so, the plaintiff would be vested with an equitable interest in 
the land for that reason, and the non-availability of specific performance 
because damages would be an adequate remedy, even if true, would be 
irrelevant. Consequently, an injunction (ie, “specific performance” in the 
“broader” or “secondary” sense noted in Ashburner) could have been 
issued to preclude the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff ’s 
said equitable interest in the land (arising by reason of his having “paid” 
the price), but because of the factors noted by the learned judge (eg, the 
third party interests that would be affected), this was not an appropriate 
case for the court to exercise its discretion to make such order, though 
they were appropriate for the court to make an order for damages in lieu 
of specific performance. 
Punitive damages for breach of contract 
12.192 Singapore courts have recognised that punitive damages may be 
awarded in cases of tortious breach of duty: see, eg, Afro-Asia Shipping 
Company (Pte) Ltd v Da Zhong Investment Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR(R) 117 
at [134], accepting that Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 is good law in 
Singapore. The question as to whether the same may be awarded where 
there has been a breach of contract, however, has hitherto remained 
open: see MFM Restaurants Pte Ltd v Fish & Co Restaurants Pte Ltd 
[2011] 1 SLR 150 (“MFM Restaurants”), noting at [53] that: “there is an 
arguable case, in principle, for the award of punitive damages in 
contract law … [though the question is] still an open one”. 
12.193 In Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd v PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte 
Ltd [2016] 1 SLR 1060 (“Airtrust”), Chan Seng Onn J took the view that 
Singapore courts have the power to award punitive damages for breach 
of contract. 
12.194 This may be contrasted with the position in England where the 
House of Lords in Addis v Gramophone Co [1909] AC 488 has 
commonly been understood to stand for the proposition, inter alia, that 
damages for breach of contract should only be awarded to compensate 
for loss, and therefore exemplary damages awarded for the purpose not 
of compensating for the plaintiff ’s loss but to punish the defendant for 
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its actions (hence “punitive” damages) may not be awarded for breach of 
contract. As the UK Law Commission observed in its report on 
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages (Law Commission 
Report No 247 at p 63, para 1.112): 
Exemplary damages are clearly unavailable in a claim for breach of 
contract. The leading authority is Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd. In that 
case[,] the House of Lords refused to award any damages – including 
mental distress damages let alone exemplary damages – for the harsh 
and humiliating manner of the plaintiff ’s wrongful dismissal. 
A similar understanding of Addis may also be found in Lord Steyn’s 
speech (at [15]) in Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2003] 1 AC 518: 
The speeches in Addis’s case are not easy to understand. Two of their 
Lordships spoke in terms of exemplary damages: see Lord James of 
Hereford, at p 492, and Lord Collins, dissenting, at pp 497  
and 500–501. That could not have been an issue. In English law such 
damages have never and cannot be awarded for breach of any contract. 
12.195 Indeed, it would appear that the same was understood to be the 
case by Chao Hick Tin JA, delivering (at [55]) the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal in Teo Siew Har v Lee Kuan Yew [1999] 3 SLR(R) 410 (“Teo 
Siew Har”): 
We will begin by first looking at the House of Lords’ decision in 
Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488, which has been taken to 
stand for the proposition that damages will not generally be awarded 
for non-pecuniary loss, in particular, mental distress. In that case, the 
plaintiff was successful in bringing a wrongful dismissal claim against 
the defendant. The Law Lords emphasised that damages for breach of 
contract were in the nature of compensation, not punishment. This did 
not include damages for his injured feelings even if he had been 
dismissed in a harsh and humiliating manner. [emphasis added] 
12.196 Admittedly, the Court of Appeal in Teo Siew Har was not 
primarily concerned with the question as to whether punitive damages 
could be awarded for breach of contract, as the issue before it was 
whether damages for mental distress per se were available for breach of 
contract. However, its citation of the above passage in Addis without 
qualification suggests that it may have accepted the English view that 
contract damages may only be compensatory, and thus may never be 
punitive. 
12.197 Making no reference to these English or Singaporean 
authorities, the learned judge in Airtrust took as his starting point 
certain observations made more recently by the Court of Appeal 
(at [53]) in MFM Restaurants: 
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Although there is an arguable case, in principle, for the award of 
punitive damages in contract law (see, for example, 
Ralph Cunnington, ‘Should Punitive Damages be Part of the Judicial 
Arsenal in Contract Cases?’ (2006) 26 Legal Studies 369 … and 
Pey-Woan Lee, ‘Contract Damages, Corrective Justice and 
Punishment’ (2007) 70 MLR 887; though cf Solène Rowan, ‘Reflections 
on the Introduction of Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract’ 
(2010) 30 OJLS 495), the case law is itself inconclusive (see, for 
example, Andrew Phang and Pey-Woan Lee, ‘Restitutionary and 
Exemplary Damages Revisited’ (2003) 19 JCL 1 at 21–31 and 
Cunnington at 389–393). … The position in Singapore is, not 
surprisingly, still an open one. 
These observations were, however, obiter. As the Court of Appeal in 
MFM Restaurants noted (at [52]): “[n]o arguments were made in 
relation to the award of punitive damages”. Furthermore, no reference 
was made in MFM Restaurants to Teo Siew Har, either. So it cannot be 
said that Teo Siew Har may have been overruled. 
12.198 Relying on this obiter passage in MFM Restaurants, the learned 
judge in Airtrust expressed the view (at [264]) that: 
Unless there is a Court of Appeal decision ruling out the availability of 
punitive damages for breach of contract, I am inclined to hold that the 
court has the power in an exceptional case to award punitive damages 
in the context of a breach of contract, when the defendant’s conduct in 
breach in the contract has been so highly reprehensible, shocking or 
outrageous that the court finds it necessary to condemn and deter 
such conduct by imposing punitive damages. 
12.199 To further bolster his view that punitive damages were available 
as a matter of Singapore law to remedy a breach of contract, the learned 
judge was content to cite (at [263]) with approval the views set out in: 
(a) Andrew Phang and Pey Woan Lee, “Restitutionary and 
Exemplary Damages Revisited” (2003) 19 CLJ 1 at 39 [sic; the 
reference should be to “19 JCL 1”], suggests that courts should 
have a residual power to award exemplary damages for breach 
of contract in “truly exceptional situations when the defendant’s 
conduct has been outrageous”; and 
(b) Ralph Cunnington, “Should Punitive Damages be Part 
of the Judicial Arsenal in Contract Cases?” (2006) 26 Legal 
Studies 369 at 380, that: “Contracts are frequently broken in 
circumstances that evoke outrage and require deterrence. All 
too often compensatory damages are inadequate for this 
purpose. Surely there is a strong argument that, in such cases, 
punitive damages should be awarded to effect deterrence.” 
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In concluding that punitive damages could be awarded for the 
defendant’s breach of contract, Chan J also agreed with the Canadian 
authorities cited by the plaintiff. 
12.200 Among others, one difficulty is that Teo Siew Har appears not to 
have been considered by the learned judge, at all. Consequently, though 
the learned judge’s discussion as to the factual criteria which he relied 
on to ascertain that this was an appropriate case to award damages is 
helpful (at [264]–[272]), their authority is doubtful given that the 
complete bar to such damages which is implicit in the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment in Teo Siew Har appears not to have been considered. 
12.201 Leaving that aside, although the trial was plainly both 
exhausting and technically challenging, it is also unfortunate that the 
trial judge’s grounds of decision does not explicitly address the legal 
arguments which had been put forward in either of the academic papers 
which the learned judge relied on, or the rationale underlying the 
Canadian position. 
12.202 So far as the Canadian position on punitive damages is 
concerned, a summary may be found in Gerald H L Fridman, The Law 
of Contract in Canada (Carswell: Toronto, 6th Ed, 2011) at p 708: 
In most of the cases since Vorvis [v Insurance Corp of British Columbia 
(1989) 58 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC)] in which that decision has been 
applied, punitive damages were not allowed. However there is no 
doubt now that if the situation is one in which the conditions for an 
award of such damages can be met, a court will do so. The conditions 
under which such damages will be awarded have been restated by the 
Ontario Court of Appeal, following Vorvis, in two cases [namely, 
Marshall v Watson Wyatt & Co (2002) 209 DLR (4th) 411, 
and 968703 Ontario Ltd v Vernon (2002) 22 BLR (3d) 161]. They 
are: (1) the defendant’s behavior must be egregious so as to offend the 
court’s sense of decency; (2) the defendant’s behavior must have 
committed an independent actionable wrong against the 
plaintiff; (3) such damages must serve a rational purpose because the 
compensatory damages are insufficient to express the court’s 
repugnance at the actions of the defendant and to punish and deter. 
12.203 Thus, as has been noted by Solène Rowan (at 30 OJLS 497) in 
the notorious case of Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co [2002] 1 SCR 595 
(“Whiten”): “[t]he majority of the Supreme Court of Canada found 
[Pilot Insurance Co] to have breached its contractual obligation to 
indemnify the appellant against the insured loss and also its duty to act 
in good faith. Punitive damages were awarded on the basis that its 
conduct in doing so, being calculated to drive the appellant into a 
position where she had little alternative but to accept a lower settlement, 
was reprehensible” [emphasis added]. For a similar reading of Whiten, 
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see Andrew Phang and Pey Woan Lee, “Exemplary Damages — Two 
Commonwealth Cases” (2003) 62 CLJ 32 at pp 34–35; Gerald H L 
Fridman, “Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract — A Canadian 
Innovation” (2003) 119 LQR 20; and Pey Woan Lee, “Contract Damages, 
Corrective Justice and Punishment” (2007) 70 MLR 886 at p 901. 
12.204 So far as the learned judge in Airtrust was minded to follow the 
Canadian authorities, it is somewhat regrettable that he did not take the 
opportunity to explain more clearly how, on the facts before him, those 
facts might have been aligned with the three criteria distilled from 
Vorvis v Insurance Corp of British Columbia (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 193 
(“Vorvis”). Of course, the Canadian position is not binding on Singapore 
courts – but the reference to the Canadian position without any 
indication as to whether its finer points were considered to be relevant 
in Airtrust leaves Singapore law in an unsettled state. In particular, it is 
not clear how it is that the defendant might be said to have committed 
an independent actionable wrong against the plaintiff, apart from its 
breach of its contractual duty to design and build the contracted-for 
components in accordance with the contract specifications – there is no 
clear finding or mention of the same in the learned judge’s grounds of 
decision. 
12.205 With regard the learned judge’s reliance on the arguments put 
forward by Andrew Phang and Pey Woan Lee, it is also to be regretted 
that no attempt was made to engage with the detail of their arguments, 
either. In particular, though Andrew Phang and Pey Woan Lee concluded 
that, on their analysis, there were good reasons to suggest that the courts 
should have the power to award punitive damages for breach of contract 
in exceptional situations where “the defendant’s conduct has been 
outrageous” ((2003) 19 JCL 1 at 69), drawing on the Canadian position 
set out in Vorvis, the two authors were also careful to note the role 
which the concept of good faith appears to play in this context, 
remarking that, “[n]otwithstanding the fact that, as a substantive 
vitiating factor, good faith is (in Commonwealth law at least) still in a 
fledgling state, … there is no reason why [the concept of good faith] 
cannot be integrated into the process of ascertaining whether or not 
exemplary damages should be awarded. Indeed, it is submitted that a 
situation which merits the award of exemplary damages would … 
probably (dare we say, necessarily) involve a situation of bad faith in any 
event” ((2003) 19 JCL 1 at 70). 
12.206 Elsewhere, the Court of Appeal has accepted that, in principle, 
a duty of good faith in the performance of one’s contractual obligations 
may be implied in fact (though not in law): Ng Giap Hon (above, 
para 12.56) at [44]–[97]. If a term to such effect had been implied in fact 
on the facts of Airtrust (above, para 12.193) (though nothing in the 
judgment makes this explicit), one may well conclude that breach of 
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such an independent duty (to act in good faith) may be enough to justify 
the imposition of punitive damages, by analogy with what appears to be 
the Canadian position. 
12.207 This is, of course, mere speculation given that the trial judge did 
not choose to spend any time on these matters. As the Court of Appeal 
rightly observed in MFM Restaurants (above, para 12.192), this area of 
law remains in a state of flux. Airtrust probably represents a step in the 
journey towards some greater clarity. And certainly, the arguments 
against such a move are not few, or inconsequential (see, eg, 
Solène Rowan (2010) 30 OJLS 505–516). So there is certainly much 
more that remains to be done if the long-standing resistance to punitive 
damages outside of tort is to be overcome. 
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